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Article
To Drink the Cup of Fury: Funeral Picketing, Public
Discourse, and the First Amendment
STEVEN J. HEYMAN
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court ruled that the Westboro Baptist
Church had a First Amendment right to picket the funeral of a young soldier killed
in Iraq. This decision reinforces a view that has become increasingly dominant in
First Amendment jurisprudence—the view that the state may not regulate public
discourse to protect individuals from emotional or dignitary injury. This Article
contends that this view not only sacrifices the law’s protections for individual
personality but also undermines the normative foundations of public discourse
itself. The Article then presents an alternative theory of the First Amendment
which holds that the same values of human dignity and autonomy that support free
speech also give rise to other fundamental rights. Thus, speakers should have a
duty to respect the personality and rights of others. Drawing extensively on the
record in Snyder as well as on other materials, the Article argues that Westboro’s
funeral picketing should not receive First Amendment protection, for the picketing
is intended to condemn the deceased and to inflict severe distress on the mourners
in violation of their rights to privacy, dignity, emotional well-being, and religious
liberty. Finally, the Article shows that although Westboro prevailed in Snyder,
this may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory, for the Court also suggested that states can
protect mourners through carefully drawn buffer-zone laws.
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To Drink the Cup of Fury: Funeral Picketing, Public
Discourse, and the First Amendment
STEVEN J. HEYMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
How far does the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech
extend?1 May the law ever restrict speech because it causes emotional or
dignitary injury to others? These were the central questions in the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps.2 On March 3, 2006,
a young Marine named Matthew Snyder was killed in the line of duty in
Iraq.3 One week later, Pastor Fred Phelps Sr. and several of his followers
from the Westboro Baptist Church (“Westboro”) picketed Matthew’s
funeral in Westminster, Maryland.4 The demonstrators held up signs
emblazoned with slogans like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “God Hates
Fags,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “America is Doomed.”5 These signs
reflected Westboro’s belief that God was killing American soldiers to
punish the nation for tolerating homosexuality and other conduct that the
church regarded as sinful.6
Matthew’s father, Albert Snyder, brought suit against Westboro and its
members for the anguish that he suffered from their picketing of the
funeral.7 A federal jury held the defendants liable for the torts of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and invasion of
privacy and awarded Snyder five million dollars in compensatory and

*
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. A.B. 1979,
J.D. 1984, Harvard. For thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this Article, I am grateful to Kate
Baldwin, Felice Batlan, Mary Jean Dolan, Tom Lewis, Thomas McAffee, Mark Rosen, Christopher
Schmidt, Adrian Walters, Christina Wells, and the participants in the Chicago-Kent Legal Theory
Workshop. Sarah Marfisi provided invaluable research assistance.
In 2010, I served as an advisor to the plaintiff’s lawyers in Snyder v. Phelps after the case reached
the Supreme Court. The views expressed in this Article are solely my own.
1
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
3
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009),
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
4
Id.
5
131 S. Ct. at 1213.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1214.
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punitive damages.
In March 2011, however, the Supreme Court
overturned this award on First Amendment grounds.9 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. acknowledged that Westboro’s
picketing had “inflict[ed] great pain” on Matthew’s father and that “its
contribution to public discourse may [have been] negligible.”10
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that the protesters had
addressed the public as a whole on matters of public concern while
standing on public property that was located a considerable distance from
the funeral.11 Under these circumstances, he held that the picketing was
entitled to the “special protection” that the First Amendment affords to
speech on matters of public concern.12
The Chief Justice was careful to note that the decision was a “narrow”
one that was “limited by the particular facts before [the Court].”13 But the
significance of the case goes far beyond that. Funeral picketing inflicts
greater pain and distress on its targets than virtually any other form of
expression. Thus, Snyder is likely to be regarded as a leading authority for
the view that the First Amendment generally bars the state from restricting
the content of speech on public issues in order to protect individuals from
emotional or dignitary injury. Of course, there is nothing novel about this
view—in recent decades, it has become the dominant position in First
Amendment jurisprudence.14 As the Snyder case shows, however, this
position is deeply problematic, for it requires the Court to protect speech
even when it causes great harm and makes little or no “contribution to
public discourse.”15
In this Article, I criticize the Snyder decision and the conception of
free speech on which it is based.16 After summarizing the decision in Part
8
Id. Damages initially were set at $10.9 million, but on a post-trial motion the district court
judge reduced the award to five million. Id.
9
Id. at 1215.
10
Id. at 1220.
11
Id. at 1217–20.
12
Id. at 1219.
13
Id. at 1220.
14
See infra Part IV.A.
15
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
16
For some valuable discussions of Snyder and the broader issue of funeral picketing, see Clay
Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps: A Pliable Standard Mingles with News
Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39 (2012) (discussing the concept of public concern in
First Amendment jurisprudence); Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55
U. KAN. L. REV. 575 (2007) (discussing funeral picketing legislation); Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time
to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67
MD. L. REV. 295 (2008) (analyzing the balance between the interest in mourning and the right of free
speech); Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court's Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, and
Normative Considerations, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 193 (2010) (exploring the conflict between freedom
of speech and the right to be let alone); Christina Wells, Regulating Offensiveness: Snyder v. Phelps,
Emotion, and the First Amendment, 1 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 71 (2010) (arguing that courts should not
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II, I argue in Part III that the majority fundamentally misunderstood the
nature of Westboro’s funeral picketing. As the group’s own statements
make clear, the message of God’s hatred is not simply addressed to the
public in general; it is also directed toward the mourners in particular. As
Shirley Phelps-Roper has explained, Westboro’s goal is to “put[] the cup of
the fury and wrath of God to your lips and [to make] you drink it.”17 The
real issue in cases like Snyder is whether there is a First Amendment right
to address speech of this sort to the mourners at a funeral and thereby cause
them profound emotional distress.
The majority did not directly confront this issue because it failed to
appreciate the fact that Westboro’s speech was directed to the mourners as
well as to the public at large. However, the Court did articulate a view of
the First Amendment that generally would preclude the state from
regulating public-concern speech in order to protect individual dignity and
personality.18 In Part IV, I argue that this view not only gives short shrift
to those values, but also tends to undermine the sphere of public discourse
itself by negating the practical and normative conditions on which it
depends.
In Part V, I outline an alternative theory of the First Amendment that
seeks to overcome these problems. According to this view, which I shall
call the liberal humanist approach, public discourse should not be
understood as a realm in which all standards of civility and respect have
been suspended, or as a marketplace that is capable of operating on its own
and neutralizing harmful expression. Instead, we should understand public
discourse as discussion among persons who recognize one another as free
and equal members of a self-governing community. On this view, the right
to free speech carries with it a duty to respect the personality and rights of
others.

recognize a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on offensive speech); Christina
E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151 (2008) (examining the impact of funeral
protest statutes on free speech); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the
Open Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2001) (defending Snyder’s claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Ronald K.L. Collins & David Hudson, A Funeral For Free Speech?,
LEGAL TIMES (Apr. 17, 2006) available at http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=16
775 (exploring whether funeral protests can be outlawed without violating the right to free speech);
and the articles in the online symposium Funerals, Fire, and Brimstone, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO,
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=
21&Itemid=26. On the regulation of funeral picketing after Snyder, see Mark Strasser, Funeral
Protests, Privacy, and the Constitution: What is Next After Phelps?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 279 (2011);
Christina E. Wells, Regulating Funeral Protests After Snyder v. Phelps (Mar. 12, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wells, “After Snyder”].
17
Hannity & Colmes (Fox News television broadcast Apr. 18, 2006), transcript available at
http://media.pfaw.org/Right/PhelpsInterview.txt (interview by Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes with
Shirley Phelps-Roper).
18
See infra Part IV.A.
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In more general terms, the liberal humanist view holds that freedom of
speech exists within a broader framework of rights, all of which are rooted
in respect for human freedom and dignity and are intended to promote the
full development and flourishing of human nature. The First Amendment
should not be interpreted to protect speech that violates the rights of other
people, except in situations where the value of the speech outweighs the
value of the other rights with which it conflicts.
The Article then applies this theory to funeral picketing. In the interest
of clarity, I begin in Part VI with the paradigmatic case of funeral
picketing—a situation in which the protesters stand so close to the funeral
that they are able to communicate with the mourners in a direct and
immediate way. I argue that such picketing causes serious injury to the
mourners and violates their rights to emotional well-being, privacy,
dignity, and religious or spiritual liberty. The value of the speech does not
warrant the injuries that it causes, because the protesters are not justified in
communicating directly with the mourners and there is no need to stand so
close to a funeral to communicate with the public at large. For these
reasons, the First Amendment should not protect funeral picketing in its
paradigmatic form.
In Part VII, I consider whether, under the liberal humanist approach,
we should reach the same conclusion on the facts of Snyder itself. This is a
much more difficult case because the protesters could not be seen or heard
from the church where the service took place. However, Westboro’s
members regarded themselves as picketing the funeral; they could be seen
from the procession; they sought to convey an intensely hateful message to
the mourners; they succeeded in communicating this message, albeit in an
indirect way; and their conduct resulted in severe emotional and dignitary
injury. Once again, they lacked sufficient justification for acting as they
did. On these grounds, I would hold that their actions were not protected
by the First Amendment. At the same time, I agree with the majority that
one of the requirements for IIED liability—a jury determination that the
defendants’ conduct was “outrageous”19—is simply too vague a standard to
govern cases involving speech that to a substantial extent involves matters
of public concern. Thus, although I believe that a state could restrict the
defendants’ conduct in Snyder without running afoul of the First
Amendment, I agree that this conduct should not give rise to tort liability
for IIED.
Finally, in Part VIII, I argue that the Court was right to suggest that the
First Amendment allows the state and federal governments to enact bufferzone laws that require protesters to stand a certain distance away from
19
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
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funerals, and I contend that this position should be interpreted broadly to
uphold laws that require the protesters to stand out of the mourners’ sight
and hearing, as the Court found that they did in Snyder itself.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION IN SNYDER
After describing the events surrounding Matthew Snyder’s funeral,
Chief Justice Roberts identified the critical issue as whether Westboro’s
speech was related to matters of public concern and thus entitled to the
highest level of First Amendment protection.20 To answer this question, he
focused on the content of the speech.21 The signs that Westboro displayed
read as follows:
“God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is
Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,”
“Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,”
“Maryland Taliban,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed
Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in
Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and
“God Hates You.”22
After quoting these signs, Chief Justice Roberts observed that:
While these messages may fall short of refined social or
political commentary, the issues they highlight—the political
and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the
fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and
scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public
import. The signs certainly convey Westboro’s position on
those issues, in a manner designed . . . to reach as broad a
public audience as possible.23
Chief Justice Roberts conceded that “a few of the signs—such as ‘You’re
Going to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You’—[could be] viewed as containing
messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically.”24 But he
insisted that “the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s
demonstration spoke to broader public issues.”25
The Chief Justice then rejected the notion that the context in which the
speech occurred should lead the Court to treat it as private rather than
public: “The fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a funeral . . .
20

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215.
Id. at 1216–17.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1217.
24
Id.
25
Id.
21
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cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”26 He
acknowledged that Westboro chose to picket where it did “to increase
publicity for its views” and that this “choice added to Mr. Snyder’s already
incalculable grief.”27 But that did not change the fact that “Westboro
conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public
place adjacent to a public street.”28 Like public streets and sidewalks, this
space amounted to “a traditional public forum” that under longstanding
doctrine could be freely used for “public assembly and debate.”29
The Chief Justice recognized that the Court had previously “identified
a few limited situations where the location of targeted picketing can be
regulated under provisions that the Court has determined to be content
neutral.”30 For example, in Frisby v. Schultz,31 the Justices upheld a ban on
targeted picketing in front of a person’s home,32 while in Madsen v.
Women’s Health Center, Inc.,33 they approved an injunction establishing a
buffer zone around the entrance to an abortion clinic.34 According to Chief
Justice Roberts, however, Snyder was clearly distinguishable in two
respects. First, the nature and the location of the activity were quite
different than in the earlier cases:
Simply put, the church members had the right to be where
they were. Westboro alerted local authorities to its funeral
protest and fully complied with police guidance on where the
picketing could be staged. The picketing was conducted
under police supervision some 1,000 feet from the church,
out of the sight of those at the church. The protest was not
unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence.35
Second, in cases like Frisby and Madsen, the restrictions were found to
satisfy the requirements of content neutrality.36 By contrast, Chief Justice
Roberts maintained that “[t]he record [in Snyder] confirms that any distress
occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint
of the message conveyed, rather than [on] any interference with the funeral
itself.”37 This point is made clear by the fact that “[a] group of
26

Id.
Id. at 1217–18.
28
Id. at 1218.
29
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30
Id.
31
487 U.S. 474 (1988).
32
Id. at 488.
33
512 U.S. 753 (1994).
34
Id. at 776.
35
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218–19. It is unclear why Roberts did not consider the repeated use of
the word fag on the picket signs profane.
36
Id. at 1218.
37
Id. at 1219.
27
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parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs
that said ‘God Bless America’ and ‘God Loves You,’ would not have been
subjected to liability.”38
For the majority, it followed that Westboro could not be held liable
without violating one of the most basic doctrines of free speech
jurisprudence: that speech on public issues “cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”39
Under the First
Amendment, the government may never “‘prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’
Indeed, ‘the point of all speech protection . . . is to shield just those choices
of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.’”40
According to the Court, these principles were especially threatened in
the present case because liability for IIED requires a finding that the
defendant’s conduct was “outrageous.”41 The use of such a subjective and
“highly malleable standard” poses a serious risk that juries will impose
liability for speech that they dislike or are offended by—a risk that is
“unacceptable” where the freedom of public debate is at issue.42
On these grounds, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s IIED claim. 43 His
claim for invasion of privacy fared no better.44 Snyder argued that
Westboro’s speech should not be protected because he “was a member of a
captive audience at his son’s funeral.”45 In response, Chief Justice Roberts
wrote:
In most circumstances, “the Constitution does not permit the
government to decide which types of otherwise protected
speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the
unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, . . . the burden normally
falls upon the viewer to avoid further bombardment of [his]
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.”46

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) and Hurley v. IrishAm. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995)).
41
Id.
42
Id. On this point, the Court drew on its earlier decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988), which held that outrageousness did not provide a sufficiently objective basis for
imposing liability on the publisher of a parody that ridiculed a public figure.
43
Id.
44
See id. at 1219–20.
45
Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 45–46, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09751)).
46
Id. at 1220 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
39
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This rule can be overcome only by “‘a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.’”47 No
such showing could be made here, the Court said, because “Westboro
stayed well away from the memorial service,” and “there is no indication
that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service itself.”48
Although the Chief Justice stressed the narrowness of the decision, he
ended by articulating its broader meaning: although speech is “powerful”
and is capable of “inflict[ing] great pain,” our nation has “chosen . . . to
protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle
public debate.”49 At the same time, he indicated that the government may
be allowed to adopt buffer-zone laws that restrict the location of funeral
picketing, so long as those laws are content neutral and satisfy the
standards that the Court has articulated for time, place, and manner
regulations.50
In dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito contended that Westboro’s speech
went “far beyond commentary on matters of public concern” and
constituted a “vicious verbal assault” on Matthew Snyder and his family. 51
“Our profound national commitment to free and open debate,” he argued,
does not require us to protect this sort of speech.52 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Stephen G. Breyer agreed with Justice Alito that the state should
sometimes have the power to protect against abusive speech.53 In this case,
however, Westboro’s speech had occurred “in a place where picketing was
lawful,” it “could not be seen or heard from the funeral ceremony itself,”
and only the tops of the signs could be seen from the procession.54 Justice
Breyer concluded that, under these circumstances, a decision upholding the
tort judgment “would punish Westboro for seeking to communicate its
views on matters of public concern without proportionately advancing the
State’s interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.”55

47

Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
Id.
49
Id. In this way, as Frederick Schauer remarks, Snyder represents one of “the clearest
[statements] the Court has ever issued . . . about the extent to which the First Amendment protects even
personally harmful speech.” Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment 14 (Univ. Va. Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 2012-23), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030444.
50
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218.
51
Id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring).
54
Id. at 1221–22.
55
Id. at 1222.
48
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III. A CRITIQUE OF THE SNYDER OPINION
The majority opinion in Snyder rests on the following propositions:
(1) that Westboro’s picketing took place on public property far from the
church and had little if any impact on the funeral; (2) that the expression
was not a personal attack on the Snyder family but was addressed to the
public on matters of public concern; and (3) that any emotional distress
caused by the speech was based on its content and viewpoint. If one
understands the facts in this way, Snyder is an easy First Amendment case
which can be resolved by a straightforward application of conventional
doctrine, and which is remarkable only because of the intense passions that
it generates. As I shall now show, however, each of these three
propositions is highly problematic.
A. The Location of the Speech
The majority stressed that Westboro’s members “fully complied with
police guidance on where the picketing could be staged” and that they
stood “at a public place adjacent to a public street” which was “some 1,000
feet from the church, out of the sight of those at the church.”56 In this way,
the opinion implies that the protesters were required to stand in a remote
location and that their conduct did not encroach on the funeral in any way.
This view of the facts is misleading in several respects.
First, Westboro itself played a significant role in determining where
the protest took place. The funeral was held at St. John’s Catholic Church,
which consists of a number of buildings spread across a large campus in
Westminster, Maryland.57 The street address is 43 Monroe Street.58
Westboro learned of Matthew Snyder’s death and the location of his
funeral from obituaries published in local news sources.59 The group then
notified the local authorities that it intended to picket at 43 Monroe Street,
and the authorities—in consultation with a priest from St. John’s—made
arrangements for the group to demonstrate at that site.60 Thus, Westboro’s
picketing took place “at the main entrance” to the St. John’s campus,

56

Id. at 1218.
An aerial photograph of the church campus is reproduced in Supplemental Joint Appendix at
SA-1, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751) [hereinafter Aerial Photograph].
58
ST. JOHN WESTMINSTER, http://www.sjwest.org (last updated Dec. 1, 2011).
59
Brief of Appellants, Appendix at 1945, Snyder v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 580 F.3d 206
(4th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1026) [hereinafter Record] (opening statement of Shirley Phelps-Roper at trial).
I am grateful to the plaintiff’s counsel, Sean Summers, Esq., and his staff for making the record
available to me.
60
See Letter from Shirley Phelps-Roper to Chief Jeffrey Spaulding, Westminster Police Dep’t
(Mar. 8, 2006), in Record, supra note 59, at 3776; Record, supra note 59, at 2244–46 (testimony of Fr.
Leo Patalinghug); Record, supra note 59, at 2281–82 (testimony of Maj. Thomas Long of Carroll
County, Maryland Sheriff’s Office).
57
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although the funeral service itself was held at a building at the opposite end
of the campus.61
Second, the trial testimony indicates that while the small strip of land
on which the demonstration was held “technically . . . belongs to the
county,” it is located immediately adjacent to the church’s property,
appears to belong to that property, and is maintained by the church.62
Third, although the funeral procession to the church normally would have
used the main entrance, the clergy arranged for the procession to take an
alternative route “[b]ecause we knew that there were going to be protesters
at the main entrance” and “we didn’t want to have a confrontation”
between the protesters and the family.63 Even so, as the majority
acknowledged, the procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the
protesters.64 Albert Snyder testified that he saw the tops of the picket signs
as the procession turned into the church campus, and that he had already
learned that there would be protesters at the funeral.65
Fourth, the Court’s assertion that the protesters were standing
“approximately 1,000 feet” from the building where the funeral occurred
arguably is also overstated.66 Finally, Westboro’s announcement that it
would picket the funeral led to the deployment of a number of law
enforcement and emergency vehicles, as well as to the gathering of a
substantial media presence—facts that, in the plaintiff’s view, contributed
to a “circus-like atmosphere during a solemn and religious occasion.”67
To be sure, none of these facts undermines the majority’s contention
that the protesters were standing too far away to affect the funeral
ceremony itself. But they do call into question the idea that the protest had
no impact on the atmosphere surrounding the funeral.
B. The Audiences for the Speech and the Messages That It Was Meant to
Convey
The lynchpin of the Court’s analysis is the contention that Westboro’s
picketing related to matters of public concern and that it was not a personal

61
Record, supra note 59, at 2244 (testimony of Fr. Leo Patalinghug); Aerial Photograph, supra
note 57.
62
Record, supra note 59, at 2242–43 (testimony of Fr. Leo Patalinghug).
63
Id. at 2244.
64
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).
65
Record, supra note 59, at 2074–75 (testimony of Albert Snyder).
66
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213. In preparation for the trial, the defendants measured the distance by
walking along a series of paths that do not run directly from the protest site to the church. See Aerial
Photograph, supra note 57. One of the measurements they obtained was 1,081 feet. Id. Using the
same photograph, I would calculate the distance as approximately 800 feet as the crow flies.
67
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751);
Record, supra note 59, at 2082 (testimony of Albert Snyder).
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attack on the Snyder family. The majority’s discussion of this point is
intertwined with another question that it does not clearly distinguish: who
was the intended audience for the speech? On this point, the majority
speaks as though the picketing was directed “to society at large,” and it
barely considers whether the speech was also directed to the family and
other mourners.69 These two points account for much of the force of the
Court’s argument—if speech is directed toward the public and relates to
matters of public concern, then clearly no private individual should be able
to interfere with it merely because he finds it upsetting. In this way the
majority seems to treat Albert Snyder, rather than Westboro, as the
interloper in this situation.
In this respect, the Court’s view of the case is deeply distorted. An
exploration of Westboro’s own statements, both in this case and elsewhere,
shows that its funeral picketing is addressed to—and directed against—not
only the community in general but also the family and mourners in
particular.
To understand Westboro’s activity, we need some understanding of its
theology and sense of its own mission.70 Westboro is a Primitive or Old
School Baptist church which was founded in Topeka, Kansas in 1955.71
The church has about sixty members, most of whom are related by blood
or marriage to its founder and pastor, Fred Phelps Sr.72 The church
subscribes to an extreme form of Calvinism, which holds that human
nature has become utterly fallen and corrupt as a result of the sin of
Adam.73 The total depravity of mankind manifests itself in all forms of sin
and especially in “sodomy,” which Westboro regards as a fundamental and
primordial transgression of God’s law.74 All human beings are deserving
68

68

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–18.
Id. at 1216–17.
70
The best account can be found in an ethnographic study of the group conducted by Rebecca
Barrett-Fox over a six-year period. See Rebecca Barrett-Fox, “Pray Not for this People for Their
Good”: Westboro Baptist Church, the Religious Right, and American Nationalism, chs. 3–4 (Dec. 8,
2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas), available at http://kuscholarworks.ku.ed
u/dspace/bitstream/1808/7738/1/BarrettFox_ku_0099D_11255_DATA_1.pdf (discussing Westboro’s
theology, ministries, and mission); see also Wells, “After Snyder,” supra note 16, at 6–9 (explaining
Westboro’s theology and practices).
71
Westboro Baptist Church, Who Are You, What Do You Do, and Why Do You Do It?,
GODHATESFAGS, http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Who (last visited Mar. 16, 2012); Barrett-Fox,
supra note 70, at 39, 137.
72
Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 103–05.
73
Id. at 155–56.
74
Id. Westboro’s view of sodomy is rooted in Old Testament verses that call it an “abomination,”
see Leviticus 20:13, 22, as well as in the first chapter of St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans, which declares
that because human beings turned away from God and fell into idolatry, God “gave them up to
uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves,”
especially through same-sex relations, Romans 1:18–27 (King James).
69
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of eternal damnation, but God, in a sovereign act of grace and mercy, has
elected to save a small number from the flames of hell.75
Westboro’s members believe “that they are the only contemporary
group that accurately understands and lives out God‘s commands, and are
thus the only people who have a reason to hope that they will enter
heaven.”76 The church is “the lone prophet of God’s word” and has been
appointed to preach the gospel of God’s wrath to the world.77 As Pastor
Phelps explained at trial, the group believes that it has a duty not merely to
proclaim this message to the public in general, but also to “go into the
highways and the hedges . . . and the byways” and to “preach the gospel to
every creature,” “[w]hether they want to hear it or not.”78 The goal of this
activity is not to convert others or to save their souls, for the church
accepts a “hyper-Calvinist” doctrine of predestination which holds that
God decided before the creation of humanity whom to save and whom to
damn.79 If an individual is destined for perdition, there is nothing that he
or anyone else can do to change that fact.80 Accordingly, Westboro does
not call on sinners to repent, nor does it offer them salvation or pray for
them to be saved.81 Although the church’s members hope that their words
will bring some unknown members of the elect to God, they preach the
message “not to help people find eternal salvation but to reveal to the
world God’s message of impending damnation.”82 In this way, they act in
obedience to God’s command and thereby gain some further assurance of
their own election.83
Picketing is the “primary method” by which the church spreads its
message.84 Of course, this is a method that is designed to communicate not
only with the public but also with the specific targets. That is
unquestionably true of the picketing that Westboro conducts at locations
other than funerals. For example, the church’s website announced that,

75
See Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 156–69 (discussing the Calvinist belief in limited
atonement).
76
Id. at 128.
77
Id. at 216, 227–30.
78
Record, supra note 59, at 2215, 2226 (testimony of Fred Phelps Sr.).
79
See Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 160–64.
80
Id. at 190.
81
See id. at 141 n.405, 157, 190. Barrett-Fox reports that, in a recent sermon, Pastor Phelps
imagined a bystander at one of Westboro’s pickets asking, “‘What can we do?’” Phelps’s reply was:
“‘Nothing. God is through with you. I’m through with you. Westboro Baptist Church is through with
you.’” He “rather gleefully” added, “‘We’re going to pray for you—that you’ll go to hell, that you’ll
be smitten.’” Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 159 (quoting Fred Phelps, Sermon (Feb. 7, 2010)).
82
Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 222, 229–30.
83
Id. at 229.
84
Westboro Baptist Church, What Ways Have You Found to Spread Your Message?,
GODHATESFAGS, http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html#SpreadMessage (last visited June 27, 2012).
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during a particular week in June 2011, its members would picket the
following places (among others):


a rock concert in Seattle, in order to convey “a message for those
in attendance” about the evils of homosexuality;85



an evangelical church in Auburn, Washington, to communicate a
message that “[y]ou have caused the people to trust in lies to their
destruction, and to your [own] damnation”;86



a feminist march against rape called SlutWalk Seattle, to tell the
participants that “if you’d quit dressing like sluts, you wouldn’t be
treated like sluts,” and that “every rape is a punishment from God
and a judgment upon you for your sins”;87 and



a United Jewish Fund event in Springfield, Illinois, “to preach
some gospel truth . . . to the reprobate Jews.”88

According to Randall Balmer—a leading American religious historian who
was called by Westboro itself as an expert witness in the Snyder case—
when the church’s members engage in demonstrations of this sort, they
seek to “confront” specific individuals “who [are] in particular need of
some message,” and to do so in a way that is “militant, in your face,
confrontational, [and] condemnatory.”89
In the case of funeral picketing, the individuals who are being
confronted are the mourners. As Westboro explained in a 2005 open letter
to lawmakers, the group is determined to “deliver [its] message to the
people going to these events, whether inside or out. That’s our intended
audience . . . .”90
85
Westboro Baptist Church Picket Schedule, http://www.godhatesfags.com/schedule.html (last
visited June 16, 2011) (June 2011 version of the webpage on file with author).
86
Id. The “lies” in question were “that God love [sic] everyone and Jesus died for the sins of all
of mankind.” Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. As Barrett-Fox explains, Westboro holds the Jews responsible for the death of Jesus and
describes them as “‘famous worldwide for being fag-enablers, babykillers, pornographers, adulterers,
fornicators, and greedy idolaters.’” Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 249–56 (quoting Westboro Baptist
Church, Naughty Figs, JEWSKILLEDJESUS.COM, http://www.jewskilledjesus.com/naughtyfigs).
89
Record, supra note 59, at 2626, 2630 (testimony of Dr. Randall Balmer). The defendants called
Balmer as an expert witness to testify that both their theology and their confrontational approach were
in accord with the tradition of American Christian fundamentalism—a characterization that Balmer
supported, though he frankly added that Westboro “pushes [that approach] to the outer limit.” Id. at
2626.
90
Westboro Baptist Church, A Message from Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) to Lawmakers on
Legislation Regarding Her Counter-Demonstrations at Funerals of Dead Soldiers 4 (Dec. 12, 2005),
http://www.godhatesfags.com/letters/20051212_legislation-message.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2012)
[hereinafter Westboro, Message to Lawmakers] (emphasis added). For this reason, the letter insisted
that lawmakers would “go too far” if they established any buffer zone that was “more than about 100

118

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:101

At its core, Westboro’s funeral picketing is intended to condemn the
deceased and to celebrate his death. As the group’s website explains, “the
scriptures specifically tell the servants of God to find comfort and rejoice
in His punishment of the wicked”91—a category that, according to
Westboro, includes everyone but a small group of God’s elect.92
Another goal of Westboro’s funeral picketing is to hold “evil doers
[such as the deceased or his family] up to public contempt, as a way to
make an example of them so that others will not go that way, or engage in
similar conduct.”93 In one of the most notorious incidents, Westboro
picketed the funeral of Matthew Shepard, a gay college student who was
tortured and murdered near Laramie, Wyoming in 1998, and proclaimed
that he was in hell.94
The news release that Westboro issued before the Snyder funeral
shows that these were among the central messages of that protest as well.
Entitled “Thank God for IEDs,” the news release asserted that Matthew
had been killed by an IED (an improvised explosive device); that “[h]e
died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation cursed by God”; and that he
was now suffering eternal punishment in hell.95
The picketing in Snyder was intended to condemn not only Matthew
himself but also his parents. This point emerges most clearly from an
Internet posting entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A.
Snyder,” which was written by Shirley Phelps-Roper several weeks after

feet” from a funeral. Id. A few months later, Westboro went further and denounced Maryland’s effort
to establish a 100-foot buffer zone. See infra text accompanying note 109.
91
Westboro Baptist Church, Why Do You Have Signs Saying “Thank God for 911,” “Thank God
for AIDS,” “Thank God for Katrina,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and
Otherwise Thanking God for Things That Humans Think Are Bad?, GODHATESFAGS,
http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Thank_God (last visited June 27, 2012).
92
See Record, supra note 59, at 477 (testimony of Rebekah Phelps-Davis) (stating that “99.9% of
the population of this world” is destined for hell); Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 128–30.
93
Westboro Baptist Church, If God Hates Homosexuals as a Group, Why Do You Sometimes Aim
Signs at Individual People, Not at the Group? How Can You Say That an Individual is in Hell?,
GODHATESFAGS, http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Individuals (last visited June 28, 2012) [hereinafter
Westboro, Individual People].
94
See Achy Obejas, Student’s Funeral Becomes Unity Rally, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 1.
Westboro’s website maintains a “‘perpetual[ ] memorial’” to Shepard which shows him burning in hell
and warning viewers to listen to the church’s message. See Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 242.
95
Westboro Baptist Church, Thank God for IEDs (Mar. 8, 2006), in Plaintiff/Appellee’s Supp.
Appendix at 158a, Snyder v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 081026) [hereinafter Westboro, News Release]. This document is reproduced as the Appendix to this
Article. See infra Appendix at p. 175.
In fact, Westboro was mistaken about the cause of Matthew’s death. At trial, Albert Snyder
testified that his son was killed when the Hum-V on which he was riding “flipped and crushed him”;
there is no indication that this event was caused by a road-side bomb. Record, supra note 59, at 2063
(testimony of Albert Snyder).
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the funeral. This document, which the parties referred to as “the epic,” is
Westboro’s own fullest account of the meaning of the protest.
In a central portion of the epic, Westboro addressed Matthew’s parents
directly:
96

God blessed you, Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, with a resource and
his name was Matthew . . . . In thanks to God for the comfort
the child could bring you, you had a DUTY to prepare that
child to serve the LORD his GOD—PERIOD! You did
JUST THE OPPOSITE—you raised him for the devil.97
The epic then accused the Snyders of teaching Matthew “to defy his
Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery.”98 By raising him in the
Roman Catholic Church, “[t]hey taught him how to support the largest
pedophile machine in the history of the entire world.”99 Finally, Matthew’s
parents “sent him to fight for the United States of Sodom, a filthy country
that is in lock step with his evil, wicked, and sinful manner of life, putting
him in the cross hairs of a God that is so mad He has smoke coming from
his nostrils and fire from his mouth! How dumb was that?”100
Taken together, the news release and the epic indicate that the protest
was intended to rejoice in Matthew’s death and to proclaim that God had
struck him down and sent him to hell to punish him for his sinfulness, as
well as to punish his parents for their own sins and for the way in which
they had raised him. These messages were expressed by many of the signs
at the funeral, including “God Hates You,” “You’re Going to Hell,” “Not
Blessed Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Thank God for
IEDs,” “God Hates Fags,” “Fag Troops,” and “Semper Fi Fags.” 101 These
messages were specifically addressed to the Snyders, among others, and
were also intended to “hold [them] up to public contempt” to discourage
others from following their example.102
96
Westboro Baptist Church, The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder, in Record,
supra note 59, at 3788 [hereinafter Epic].
97
Id. at 3791.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. In a later post, Westboro described Albert Snyder as “an evil man who was not content to
go to hell quietly after miserably failing his family,” but who “added to his crimes in that he sued the
servants of the true and living God.” Record, supra note 59, at 2679–80 (testimony of Timothy Phelps,
quoting statement posted on Westboro’s website).
101
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216–17 (2011).
102
Westboro, Individual People, supra note 93. Matthew was not gay and there is no evidence
that Westboro believed that he was. It might seem, then, that the last three signs were not directed at
him personally, but only at the United States military or at soldiers who in fact were homosexual.
Westboro’s members use fag in a broader sense, however. As Timothy Phelps explained at trial, they
define the term to include not only “those that are actually engaged in homosexual behavior,” but also
“those who aggressively advocate for and enable it.” Record, supra note 59, at 2348 (testimony of
Timothy Phelps). On these grounds Westboro considers “all elements of [the military to be] fags
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Westboro’s picketing is directed not only toward the grieving family
but also toward the other mourners. On its website, the church explains
that it pickets funerals “[t]o warn the people who are still living that unless
they repent, they will likewise perish. When people go to funerals, they
have thoughts of mortality, heaven, hell, eternity, etc., on their minds. It’s
the perfect time to warn them of things to come.” 103 Westboro
acknowledges that, according to commonly accepted standards, its conduct
may be regarded as “mean, hateful, [and] uncompassionate” toward the
mourners, as well as “hateful and disrespectful of the dead.”104 The group
replies, however, that according to its own standards “it would be infinitely
more mean, hateful, [and] uncompassionate . . . to keep [our] mouth[s] shut
and not warn you that you, too, will soon have to face God.”105
Another target of the picketing in Snyder was the Catholic Church—
not only the Pope and the church in general, but also the particular parish
in which Matthew had been raised and in which his funeral was held.
Westboro’s news release stated that it would picket the funeral “at St.
John’s Catholic dog kennel.”106 Likewise, the epic declared that God had
“killed Matthew so that His servants would have an opportunity to preach
His words to . . . the whorehouse called St. John Catholic Church.”107 At
the funeral, Westboro’s anti-Catholic message was expressed by signs that
read “Priests Rape Boys” and “Pope in Hell,” as well as by more general
signs like “God Hates You” and “You’re Going to Hell.”108
In many instances, Westboro’s funeral picketing is also addressed to,
and directed against, the local community or state in which it takes place.
One of the signs in this case read “Maryland Taliban”—a sign that was
meant to denounce the Maryland legislature for considering a bill (which
was later enacted) to prohibit demonstrations within 100 feet of a
funeral.109 Westboro’s members brought this sign not only to Matthew’s
funeral but also to the Maryland State House, where they protested on the
same day.110 The epic declared that the State of Maryland was seeking “to
blot out the word of God from the landscape,” and that God would respond
by “blot[ting] out their young men.”111 Because the community rejected
including the troops,” and signs like “Fag Troops” are intended to refer to all soldiers. Id. at 2332–33.
The same point is made in a DVD entitled “Fag Troops” which Westboro submitted at trial. Id. at
3802–03.
103
Westboro Baptist Church, Why Do You Picket Funerals?, GODHATESFAGS,
http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Funeral (last visited July 7, 2012).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Westboro, News Release, supra note 95.
107
Epic, supra note 96, at 3793.
108
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).
109
Id. at 1216; see also Record, supra note 59, at 2535 (testimony of Shirley Phelps-Roper).
110
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213.
111
Epic, supra note 96, at 3793.
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the message that had been delivered to it by “[t]he servants of God,” “[i]t
will be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the Day of Judgment
than for the people of Maryland.”112
Finally, Westboro’s funeral picketing is addressed to, and meant to
condemn, America as a whole. As Pastor Phelps has explained, the signs
seek to convey “the only righteous message for this evil nation that has
gone the way of the Brokeback Mountain. God’s wrath is upon this
nation. And he’s pouring out that wrath by killing these soldiers . . . and
sending them back in body bags. And it’s only going to get worse.”113
In sum, the majority misconstrued the funeral picketing in Snyder
when it asserted that Westboro was simply attempting to communicate
with the public on matters of public concern such as the conduct and fate
of our country. Instead, the picketing was directed toward, and was meant
to condemn, the Snyder family, the mourners, and the local religious
community, as well as the state and the nation as a whole.114 As I shall
now show, that is exactly how it was received.
C. The Basis for the Plaintiff’s Emotional Distress
After focusing on the speakers and their message, the majority opinion
moved on to the audience and how it received the speech. “The record,”
Chief Justice Roberts asserted, “confirms that any distress occasioned by
Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message
conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself.”115 In this
way, he suggested that the distress resulted simply from the controversial
nature of the defendant’s religious and political views—something that
clearly cannot justify a restriction on speech.116
Remarkably, however, Chief Justice Roberts cited no evidence from
“[t]he record” to support his assertion.117 In fact, the evidence goes the
112

Id.
Interview by Michael Smerconish with Fred Phelps on Scarborough Country (Apr. 11, 2006)
(transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12285618/ns/msnbc_tvmorning_joe/t/scarborough-country-april/). On its website, Westboro explains that it pickets soldiers’
funerals because “with full knowledge of what they were doing, they voluntarily joined a fag-infested
army to fight for a fag-run country now utterly and finally forsaken by God who Himself is fighting
against that country.” Westboro Baptist Church, Why Do You Picket Soldiers’ Funerals?,
GODHATESFAGS, http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Soldier_Funeral (last visited July 7, 2012).
114
It may even be said that Westboro’s picketing is intended to condemn the entire world, for the
group believes that nearly all human beings are predestined for hell. Indeed, on one of the church’s
websites, a user can click on any part of an interactive map of the world to discover why God hates that
particular country. Westboro Baptist Church, GODHATESTHEWORLD.COM,
http://www.godhatestheworld.com/ (last visited July 7, 2012).
115
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219.
116
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
117
See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (citing no evidence from the record).
113
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other way. To be sure, Albert Snyder testified that he disagreed with the
views held by Westboro’s members, such as their condemnation of the
United States and their belief that the Bible’s message is one of hatred
rather than love.118 But he made clear that what upset him so deeply was
not the general views that they held but the ways in which their conduct
amounted to “an assault” on himself and his family.119
Snyder testified that on (or shortly before) the morning of the funeral,
he had heard “that there were going to be some protesters there from the
Kansas church,” but that he did not know what the protest was about and
did not give it much thought.120 As the procession turned into the church
campus, he “saw the top of signs,” but he “couldn’t see what they said [or]
who was holding them.”121 An hour or two after the burial, he was
standing with some family and friends in his parents’ house when someone
turned on the television to see the news.122 Snyder hoped to see the funeral
procession and the tribute that had been paid to his son by the people who
had lined the route.123 Instead, he was stunned to see Fred Phelps Sr. and
Shirley Phelps-Roper expressing their hateful message.124 At this point,
and also while reading the newspaper the next day, Snyder saw what was
written on the signs.125
Snyder testified that he was deeply upset by the signs that he
interpreted to be an attack on his family. For example, he understood
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers” to mean that the protesters “were thanking
God my son was dead,” and “You’re Going to Hell” to refer to Matthew
since “[h]e was the only dead one there.”126 Similarly, he took “Fag
Troops” to be an assertion that Matthew was gay.127 By contrast, Snyder
testified that he was less bothered by signs like “God Hates the USA” and
“God Hates Fags” because “they were more general” and were not directed
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Record, supra note 59, at 2116, 2119, 2154 (testimony of Albert Snyder).
Id. at 2131–32, 2145.
120
Id. at 2074, 2078–79. Snyder “thought they were going to be war protesters,” rather than what
they turned out to be. Id. at 2074.
121
Id. at 2075.
122
Id. at 2085, 2088.
123
Id. at 2083, 2085. For a description of this tribute, see infra notes 371–72 and accompanying
text.
124
Record, supra note 59, at 2085–86 (testimony of Albert Snyder). Snyder explained that he
was in such shock at that time that he could not recall the specifics of what the Phelpses had said. Id.
Presumably, it was along the same lines as other statements they made to the media that day. For
example, after asserting that Matt’s parents “hated him in life and they hated him in death,” Shirley
Phelps-Roper said, “I think these soldiers [who] went into this war were volunteering, knew this is a
nation that flips off God every day. I say they all deserve death. I say thank God for dead soldiers.”
Id. at 2414–15 (newspaper article quoted during examination of Shirley Phelps-Roper).
125
Id. at 2072, 2086–88 (testimony of Albert Snyder).
126
Id. at 2086, 2113, 2119.
127
Id. at 2087, 2120.
119
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at his family.
In short, Snyder’s emotional distress was caused not by
his disagreement with Westboro’s general political or religious views, but
by what he regarded as their unbelievably “cruel” and “heartless” conduct
in causing pain to a family in mourning and taking “the dignity away
from” Matthew’s funeral, thereby “tarnish[ing] the memory of my son’s
last hour on earth.”129
128

D. Conclusion
The Supreme Court fundamentally misunderstood the problem of
funeral picketing in cases like Snyder. Westboro did not merely hold a
demonstration that was “planned to coincide with Matthew Snyder’s
funeral”130a demonstration that was meant to address the public as a
whole on issues of public concern, and that caused emotional distress only
because of disagreement with the views it expressed on those issues.
Instead, the Phelpses stood immediately adjacent to the church campus to
“picket [the] funeral”131 in order to give thanks for Matthew Snyder’s
violent death and to convey a message of God’s wrath to his family,
friends, and religious community, as well as to the state and the nation.
The plaintiff understood this message exactly as it was intended and
thereby suffered severe emotional and dignitary injury. The question
posed by the case is whether the First Amendment should be interpreted to
protect speech that causes this sort of injury. The Court failed to come to
terms with this issue, not only because of the way it read the record, but
also because the Court’s approach to public discourse makes it very
difficult to deal with problems of this sort.
IV. PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
In Snyder, the Court outlined a general view of the constitutional
protections for public discourse, a view which the Justices have developed
gradually over the past half-century and which is characteristic of
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence. In this Part, I describe this
view and argue that it suffers from fatal flaws and contradictions—
problems that clearly emerge when it is applied to funeral picketing.
A. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Public Discourse
The Court’s approach rests on a basic distinction between public and
private speech. As Chief Justice Roberts explained in Snyder, speech on
128

Id. at 2116–17, 2120.
Id. at 2072, 2114, 2187.
130
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
131
Westboro, News Release, supra note 95.
129
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public affairs is essential to democratic self-government.
For this
reason, it “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values, and is entitled to special protection.”133 By contrast, the
Constitution affords less rigorous protection to “speech on purely private
matters” because restrictions on such speech do not pose a “threat to the
free and robust debate of public issues” or interfere with “a meaningful
dialogue of ideas.”134
On this view, the First Amendment’s ban on censorship applies most
strongly within the realm of public discourse. According to the Court,
“[t]he essence of this forbidden censorship is content control.”135 For this
reason, laws that regulate speech on the basis of its content are treated as
“presumptively invalid.”136
More specifically, the Court has taken the position that the state
generally may not restrict public-concern speech in order to protect other
people from emotional or dignitary harm. 137 Thus, in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell,138 the Court asserted that speech could not be restricted because it
“may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.”139 In Boos v.
Barry,140 the Court held that the same principle barred the state from
restricting speech to protect the “dignity” of other people.141 Instead, the
Justices said that “in public debate . . . citizens [generally] must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”142
In these decisions, the Court has been guided by Justice William J.
Brennan Jr.’s statement in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan143 that the First
132
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Court merely paid them lip service a few months later in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). There, a 5-4 majority struck down a law banning the sale to
minors of ultraviolent video games which hardly purported to address public affairs. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
at 2732–33, 2741–42. The majority subjected the law to the same strict scrutiny that the Court applies
to laws restricting public-issue speech. Id. Taken together, Snyder and Brown lead one to wonder how
seriously the Court takes its assertions about the distinction between public and private speech.
135
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
136
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). For further discussion of the contentneutrality doctrine, see infra Part V.D.
137
For a powerful defense of this position, see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of
Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990). I discuss Post’s view below. See infra text accompanying notes
265–78.
138
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
139
Id. at 55.
140
485 U.S. 312 (1988).
141
Id. at 322.
142
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
133

2012]

TO DRINK THE CUP OF FURY

125

Amendment embodies “a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”144 As
Justice Brennan later declared in Texas v. Johnson,145 “If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.”146
In all of these cases, the speech related to public figures (Hustler),
public officials (New York Times), the government itself (Johnson), or
foreign officials and governments (Boos). But in some other decisions, the
Court has extended these doctrines to speech that is directed against private
persons. For example, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,147 the Court
held that speech did not lose its protected status simply because it might
embarrass individuals or coerce them into supporting a civil rights
boycott,148 while in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,149 the Court
held that the First Amendment afforded some protection to insulting and
abusive speech directed toward women entering abortion clinics or
individuals who worked there.150 Snyder goes even further: although it
does not squarely confront the issue, it suggests that the First
Amendment’s protections apply even to “vehement” and “caustic” speech
that is directed against grieving family members who are about to bury a
loved one.151 In this way, the Snyder opinion brings out the main features
of the Court’s approach in a very clear and striking manner. And it raises
the question of whether that approach is in fact the best way to understand
the freedom of speech.
B. A Critique of the Court’s Approach
The Court’s current approach suffers from several serious problems.
Here I shall discuss three of them: (1) its use of abstract categories; (2) its
protection of free speech at the expense of other important values; and (3)
its tendency to undermine the foundations of public discourse itself.
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1. Abstraction
The first difficulty with the Court’s approach lies in its use of abstract
categories. The Snyder majority insisted that “the overall thrust and
dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration” related to matters of public
concern.152 For this reason, the speech could not be restricted simply
because it caused pain or offense to the family.153 In dissent, Justice Alito
objected that “this portrayal is quite inaccurate,” and that the personal
attack on Matthew and his family was “of central importance.”154 As I
have shown, however, Westboro’s speech had both public and private
dimensions: while the speech was meant to warn the nation of God’s
wrath, it was also meant to tell the mourners that God had struck down
Matthew and sent him to hell for “his evil, wicked, and sinful manner of
life” and that they were headed for the same fate.155 Moreover, these two
communications were deeply intertwined: by confronting Matthew’s
family, Westboro sought to gain widespread publicity for its views, while
the condemnation of the Snyders was partly based on their connections to
institutions such as the United States military and the Roman Catholic
Church. Signs like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” contained general
statements, but Westboro intended those statements to apply to Matthew in
particular, and his family understood them in the same way. Under these
circumstances, it is fruitless to ask whether the speech is essentially a
contribution to public discourse or essentially a personal attack: both
things are true at the same time.
This point reveals the limitations of the Court’s approach, with its
sharp distinction between public-concern and private-concern speech. Of
course, some First Amendment cases involve expression that clearly falls
into the public category (such as the criticism of public officials in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan156) or into the private category (such as the
credit-reporting service in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.157) But cases like Snyder involve speech that straddles this divide. In
such cases, the use of these abstract categories is simply too crude a tool to
allow for a thoughtful consideration of the values at stake.
In Snyder, Chief Justice Roberts sometimes phrases the question as
whether the speech related to “purely private matters.”158 Thus, he might
respond that even if Westboro’s speech did constitute a personal attack, it
still should be protected so long as it also related to matters of public
152
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concern. This leads to the next problem I want to raise—that the Court’s
approach unduly sacrifices other values to the protection of free speech.
2.

Protecting Free Speech at the Expense of Other Fundamental
Values

In Snyder, the jury determined that Westboro had “maliciously”
violated the plaintiff’s rights by intentionally or recklessly inflicting severe
emotional distress through “extreme and outrageous” conduct, and by
invading his privacy in a way that was “highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”159 On appeal, Westboro did not dispute these findings, and the
Supreme Court accepted them for purposes of the decision.160 Indeed, the
Chief Justice recognized that Westboro’s conduct “inflict[ed] great pain”
and “anguish” in a way that “added to Mr. Snyder’s already incalculable
grief.”161 At the same time, Chief Justice Roberts conceded that the
“contribution [of Westboro’s funeral picketing] to public discourse may be
negligible.”162 Nevertheless, he concluded that the speech was entitled to
First Amendment protection. Such a position can only be described as
tragic, for it holds that we can be faithful to one of our most cherished
principles—freedom of expression—only by denying protection to
individual personality, a value that (as I shall argue in Part V) is just as
worthy of respect.
3. Undermining the Normative and Practical Conditions of Public
Discourse
A defender of the Court’s approach might reply that while the state
should be allowed to protect individuals from some forms of abusive
speech in the private realm, it may not do so in the public realm, for that
would undermine the paramount value of democratic self-government.
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, in the American
tradition, there is a deep connection between the idea of democracy and the
idea of individual rights. Democracy is the way in which free and equal
individuals govern themselves on matters of common concern. At the
same time, one of the primary functions of democratic government is to
protect individual rights. It follows that individual rights should not be
sacrificed to the value of democratic self-government except when there is
a clear need to do so.
Second, as I shall argue in the next Part, public discourse itself
depends on mutual recognition and respect among citizens. On one level,
this is a practical requirement: many individuals will feel alienated from
159
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and reluctant to participate in public discourse if it is not conducted in a
way that affords them at least minimal respect as persons. And mutual
recognition is also a normative requirement because the outcome of public
debate can be regarded as legitimate and binding only if it is conducted on
this basis.
These points are dramatically illustrated by the Snyder case. The
majority takes the position that the state may not protect individual
personality in the public realm because “speech concerning public
affairs . . . is the essence of self-government,” and because of the threat
that regulation would pose to “a meaningful dialogue of ideas.”163 But
what sort of “meaningful dialogue” could exist between the Westboro
protesters and the mourners at a funeral? To begin with, that is not the
goal of funeral picketing. As Westboro has stated:
We are not really interested in a dialogue with you demonposessed [sic] perverts. We are not out to change your
minds, win your soul to Jesus, agree to disagree, find
common ground upon which to build a meaningful long-term
relationship, or any other of your euphemisms for
compromising in our stance on the Word of God.164
As for the mourners themselves, their focus is on remembering the person
they have lost. Under these circumstances, Westboro’s picketing, with its
condemnation of the mourners and the deceased, and its celebration of his
death, cannot be experienced as anything other than a brutal attack and a
gross intrusion into their emotional and spiritual lives.
It is true that the protesters are also trying to attract the attention of the
community at large. But they are deliberately doing so by means of an
attack on the deceased and the mourners. As I shall argue, at its deepest
level, the community is founded on respect for the personality of all of its
members. It follows that community members are bound to experience
Westboro’s picketing not as a legitimate contribution to public debate, but
as an assault on their fellow citizens as well as on the community itself.
Under these conditions, no “meaningful dialogue” is possible. Indeed,
the majority seemed to acknowledge this fact when it remarked that
Westboro’s funeral picketing makes little or no “contribution to public
discourse.”165 This statement can hardly rest on a wholesale assessment of
Westboro’s religious and ideological views, such as the claim that America
is violating God’s law and incurring divine wrath. Whatever one thinks of
such views, it is hard to deny that they are provocative and that they do
163
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make some contribution to public debate. Thus, the majority’s statement
seems to reflect the view that the church is expressing its beliefs in a
manner that contravenes the most basic conditions of public discussion,
and that this prevents the expression from being received as part of a
meaningful exchange.
In these ways, the Court’s current approach to public discourse is
internally contradictory and self-defeating. For both practical and
normative reasons, public discourse depends on mutual respect among
citizens. When the Court insists on granting constitutional protection to
speech that violates this principle, it not only sacrifices the value of
individual personality but also undermines the conditions for democratic
deliberation itself.
V. A LIBERAL HUMANIST THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The root problem with the Supreme Court’s approach is that it fails to
recognize that all of the values of a democratic society are ultimately
founded on respect for the freedom and dignity of human beings. What we
need is a theory of the First Amendment that places those values at its
center. In this Part, I outline such a theory, which I call the liberal
humanist approach.166 This view is rooted in the Lockean natural rights
tradition, which deeply influenced the adoption of the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment.167 At the same time, this view draws on our
contemporary understandings of human personality, community, and
rights.
In Section A, I explore the phenomenology of free speech. I argue that
for communication to take place, the participants must recognize one
another as persons, and that this is true in both the private and the public
realms. In Section B, I explore the concept of personality in greater depth,
and show that it not only justifies the freedom of speech but also gives rise
to other important rights which impose some limits on that freedom.
Section C discusses how we should deal with substantial conflicts between
free speech and other rights. In Section D, I discuss the implications of
this theory for the doctrine of content neutrality, which is central to the
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence. Section E considers some
objections to the liberal humanist approach, and especially the objection
that the right to be free from dignitary and emotional injury is too
subjective to support restrictions on speech. Finally, Section F contrasts
the liberal humanist approach with other theories of public discourse.
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A. The Phenomenology of Free Speech
At the core of the liberal humanist theory is a conception of
personality. Persons are capable of forming and expressing their own
thoughts and feelings and of directing their own actions. This capacity for
self-determination is the basis of human dignity and autonomy. As a
person, I demand recognition and respect from others. But I can expect to
receive this recognition and respect only if I am willing to accord the same
treatment to others. All human interaction depends on mutual recognition,
which is a form of thought and expression that affirms the freedom and
dignity of the individuals concerned and, at the same time, establishes a
relationship of community between them.168
1. Private Speech
In addition to being one of the most important forms of communication
in its own right, mutual recognition is inherent in all other sorts of human
communication. To see this point, consider the most basic kind of
communication: a conversation between two individuals.169 On one level,
a conversation involves an exchange of information, attitudes, beliefs,
requests, and so on. On a deeper level, however, it involves a relationship
between persons.170 This relationship is based on mutual recognition. To
communicate with another individual, I must recognize her as an
intelligent being who is capable of understanding language or other forms
of symbolic expression. Likewise, if she is to regard the sounds or
gestures that I make not as gibberish but as intelligible expression, she
must regard me as an intelligent being who is capable of using language or
other symbols to express meaning.
In this way, every conversation involves a relationship in which the
participants recognize one another as persons.
Of course, these
relationships vary greatly, from the most significant and long-lasting to the
most transient and inconsequential, such as two strangers conversing about
the weather. In the conversation, each person seeks not only to promote
her own views and interests, but also to reach a common understanding
and to promote an interest that she shares with her interlocutor. Thus, as
contemporary communications scholars have argued, conversations do not
168
The concept of recognition is most fully developed in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. See,
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simply involve the transmission of meanings from one individual to
another, but instead involve shared work and a joint production of
meaning.171
To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that all conversations are—or
should be—amicable in nature. On the contrary, some involve strong
disagreements or expressions of anger. Even in those situations, however,
an exchange of sounds and gestures can be regarded as an instance of
communication only when the participants view one another as intelligent
persons who are capable of understanding and expressing meaning. In
fact, when people argue with one another, they can be seen as appealing to
standards that they share—or could come to share—as persons. For
example, if a woman accuses her husband of disregarding her feelings by
flirting with another woman at a party, she is implicitly relying on a
general notion about the respect that individuals owe one another, as well
as on a more specific notion about the obligations that spouses have to
each other.
Yet some acts of speech are simply inconsistent with the duty to
recognize the personality of others. A dramatic example may be found in
the 1982 Kansas case of Gomez v. Hug.172 In that case, it was alleged that
a county commissioner named Hug had ordered Gomez, one of his
subordinates, to walk over to him and had then shouted, “You are a
fucking spic. . . . A fucking Mexican greaser like you, that is all you are.
You are nothing but a fucking Mexican greaser, nothing but a pile of shit”
—a torrent of epithets that he repeated over and over again.173 This act of
expression reflected a deep contradiction. On one hand, Hug clearly
recognized that Gomez was a person who was capable of understanding
the content of his tirade. But on the other hand, the content itself was so
degrading and humiliating that it was utterly incompatible with the respect
that Hug owed Gomez as a person. In a situation like this, it becomes clear
that mutual recognition is not merely a descriptive concept, which points to
a condition that is necessary for communication to occur at all, but also a
normative principle, which establishes the ground rules for legitimate
communication. In this case, Hug’s speech violated those rules in the most
flagrant manner.
This discussion suggests two further points. First, in legitimate
communication, each participant recognizes the other as an intelligent
being who is capable of using and understanding language. It follows that,
in principle, communication is dialogical, not monological: each
participant must be free to express his own views and to respond to those
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expressed by the other.
Thus, Hug violated the ground rules of
communication not only by treating Gomez as subhuman, but also by using
his own power as a supervisor to deny Gomez an opportunity to speak up
for himself.
Second, the duty to recognize others as persons entails a duty to
respect the rights that flow from this status. These rights include both
positive rights to act in particular ways and negative rights to be free from
particular forms of injury and abuse. In the Kansas case, for example, the
court held that Hug’s speech may have violated Gomez’s rights to equality
in the workplace and to freedom from intentional infliction of emotional
distress.175 When speech violates important rights of this sort, it not only
contravenes the ground rules of communication, but also causes serious
injury to individuals.
2. Public Speech
In Snyder, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, under the First
Amendment, the state sometimes may restrict private speech in order to
protect individuals from dignitary or emotional injury. 176 But the Court
insisted that public discourse is essentially different and is largely immune
from regulation on these grounds.177
Of course, it is true that private and public discourse differ in important
ways, including the nature of the audiences and the issues that they
address. On the most fundamental level, however, the two forms of speech
should be regarded as similar, for public discourse also presupposes mutual
recognition.
The roots of this idea may be found in the natural rights tradition.
According to John Locke, all human beings are naturally free and equal
and belong to a single community.178 This “great and natural Community”
is bound together by reason, which teaches that all individuals have a duty
to recognize the humanity and inherent rights of others.179 In addition to
life, liberty, and property, these rights include freedom of thought and
belief.180 To secure these rights, individuals enter into a social contract—
174
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an agreement that is necessarily premised on mutual recognition.181
Through this contract, individuals form a particular political community
with the power to make and enforce laws and adjudicate disputes.182 In
this way, controversies over rights come to be determined not by the
private judgment of individuals but by the public judgment of the
community.183 Of course, this judgment can be formed only through
public discussion.
Initially, all political power is vested in the people as a whole.184 The
people commonly delegate their power to a government, which is required
to use that power to protect individual rights and to promote the public
good.185 At the same time, the people always retain the right to determine
whether the government is discharging its responsibilities in a faithful and
effective manner.186
The implications of this view for freedom of speech were developed by
two radical Whig disciples of Locke: John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon.
In a series of essays called Cato’s Letters, they argued that because rulers
were merely “the trustees of the people,” the people were entitled to
oversee their conduct to ensure that they did not abuse their trust.187 Thus,
freedom of speech was not only an inalienable right of individuals but was
also “inseparable from publick Liberty.”188 In this way, Trenchard and
Gordon synthesized Lockean natural rights theory with the civic republican
tradition, which stressed the need for public-spirited individuals to actively
participate in political life to promote the public good.189 Like the works of
Locke, Cato’s Letters was widely read in eighteenth-century America and
had a deep influence on the new nation’s conception of free speech and
republican liberty.190
Thus, eighteenth-century Americans inherited a rich body of political
thought which associated freedom of speech with the ideal of a free society
that was based on mutual recognition and respect. This ideal played an
important role in the founding of the nation and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights.191
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A similar ideal may be found in the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn,
which constitute one of the most influential modern defenses of political
free speech.192 Drawing on the language of social contract theory,
Meiklejohn maintains that Americans have entered into a “compact or
agreement” to form a democratic society.193 This society is bound together
by an “attitude of mutual regard” among individuals who see themselves as
“a group of free and equal men” who are “cooperating in a common
enterprise.”194 Under this “form of government,” Meiklejohn writes,
“every citizen has, and has a right to have, dignity—the dignity of men
who govern themselves.”195
These ideas play a central role in Meiklejohn’s account of the First
Amendment. He develops this account by reference to “the traditional
American town meeting,” in which members of the community gather to
debate and decide matters of public concern.196 In this setting, citizens
“meet as political equals.”197 Political discussion is an open and reciprocal
exchange in which each person has “a right and a duty to think his own
thoughts, to express them, and to listen to the arguments of others.”198 The
principle of free speech means that citizens “may not be barred [from
speaking] because their views are thought to be false or dangerous,” or
because they take “one side of the issue rather than another.”199 At the
same time, the very nature of the town meeting requires certain limits on
expression: “If a speaker wanders from the point at issue, if he is abusive
or in other ways threatens to defeat the purpose of the meeting, he may be
and should be declared ‘out of order.’”200
Like the interpersonal conversation which I discussed in the previous
section, Meiklejohn’s town meeting offers a valuable paradigm for
exploring the nature of communication. In both cases, communication can
be understood on two different levels: on one level, it involves an
genuinely dedicated to a special concept of how decisions should be made in a
republic. He believed that a republic ultimately rests on mutual respect among its
citizens and on a recognition on the part of all that they are the constituents of a
community of mutually regarding equals, participators in a polity that asks them to
be conscious that they are, at once, the rulers and the ruled.
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exchange of information and ideas, while on another level, it involves a
relationship between persons. Of course, the nature of the relationship
differs greatly in these two situations. In its simplest form, a conversation
involves a bilateral relationship between two persons. By contrast, the
political community that is assembled in the town meeting involves a more
complex relationship, in which the individual relates to the community as a
whole as well as to her fellow citizens. But this complex relationship is
also founded on mutual recognition and respect. Speech that accords with
these principles makes a contribution to what Meiklejohn calls “the
thinking process of the community” by offering information and opinions
that bear on the common good.201 By contrast, speech that is “abusive”202
toward other members can be regarded as wrongful in several ways. First,
it can cause emotional and dignity injuries to the target(s) in a way that is
comparable to the injuries that result from insults in a private
conversation.203 Second, it tends to degrade and humiliate the target(s) in
the eyes of the community as a whole. And finally, it injures the
community itself by violating the ground rules for debate—rules that serve
not only to protect the “dignity” of its members but also to protect the
functioning of the meeting itself.204
Although Meiklejohn’s image of the town meeting is an illuminating
one, it obviously does not fully capture the nature of political discourse in a
large, diverse modern society. Unlike speech in the town meeting, that
discourse does not take place within a single, unitary forum that is held at a
specific time and place. Nor does public discourse have a set agenda that
determines what issues shall be discussed and for what period of time.
Instead, it consists of many different forms of expression that occur in a
wide variety of forums throughout the society and over the course of time,
including individual conversations, social media, political rallies, candidate
debates, newspapers, cable news talk shows, and the Internet, to mention
only a few.205
In this situation, many of Meiklejohn’s “rules of order” 206 are clearly
irrelevant. It would be absurd to restrict an individual’s speech at a
political rally on the ground that she had “wander[ed] from the point at
issue,” or that she had merely repeated what others had already said.207
Likewise, many expressions that would be ruled out of order as “abusive”
201

Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 25.
203
See supra text accompanying notes 172–75 (discussing Gomez v. Hug).
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MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 192, at 24–25, 68.
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in a town meeting or a legislative debate would barely raise an
eyebrow if they appeared in the comments section of a political blog.
In my view, however, none of this undermines Meiklejohn’s more
basic claim that public discourse depends on an “attitude of mutual regard”
among citizens.210 No matter how complex public discourse may be, at
bottom it involves communication between persons.
As such, it
necessarily presupposes mutual recognition.
To elaborate this point, suppose that a hate group calls for the
deportation or extermination of a small and vulnerable ethnic group within
the society. This speech might be addressed to members of the ethnic
group itself or to other members of the society. To the extent that it is
directed to the former, the speech suffers from the same contradiction that
we saw in connection with Gomez v. Hug: in addressing the target group
members, the speaker implicitly assumes that they are intelligent beings
who are capable of understanding and using language—that is, that they
are persons—yet at the same time, the speech denies that their status and
rights as persons.211 In this way, the content of the speech directly
conflicts with the formal conditions that make the speech comprehensible
and legitimate.
Suppose, however, that we regard the hate group’s speech as addressed
not to the target group but to other members of the society. In this
situation, the contradiction that we noticed in connection with Gomez does
not exist. But another, equally serious one does: while the speakers regard
the audience members as intelligent persons, they deny the humanity of
others (the target-group members) who have an equal claim to that status
and who are also members of the society. In this situation, the audience
members cannot understand and accept the hate group’s speech without
betraying their fellow citizens as well as their own humanity. This too is a
fatal contradiction which undermines the legitimacy of the speech.
From a liberal humanist perspective, then, public discourse consists of
discussion among individuals who recognize one another as persons and
members of the community. Once again, this does not mean that speech
must always be polite or nonconfrontational. In a free society, competing
interests and ideological commitments will often lead to profound social
and political conflict. Public debate provides a forum in which such
conflicts can be fought out. But if it is to perform this function, and if such
conflicts are not to degenerate into all-out warfare, there must be some
208

Id. at 25.
See, e.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XVII ¶ 1(b) (112th Cong.),
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common ground on which citizens can stand to discuss their differences.
At the deepest level, this common ground arises from mutual recognition.
B. The Justifications for Free Speech and Other Rights
In the previous section, I argued that the concept of mutual recognition
is central to all forms of human interaction, especially communication.
Individuals can communicate only when they recognize one another as
persons. Because persons have rights, this duty of recognition extends to
their rights as well. Thus, the right to free speech carries with it a duty to
respect the fundamental rights of others.
What are these rights, and how can we identify them? To answer these
questions we must further explore the concepts of freedom and dignity that
are inherent in personality. In this section, I discuss what those concepts
mean in the various areas of human life: (1) the external world; (2) the
internal domain of thought and feeling; (3) the social, political, and cultural
sphere; and (4) the intellectual and spiritual realm. These four areas
correspond to the leading justifications for freedom of expression: that it is
an aspect of external freedom; that it is essential for individual selffulfillment; that it is necessary for democratic self-government; and that it
is vital for the search for truth. As I shall show, however, these same
aspects of human freedom and dignity also give rise to other fundamental
rights. Speakers should have a duty to respect these rights, except in cases
where the value of the speech outweighs the value of the other rights. In
this way, we can develop a rich and complex account that embraces both
freedom of speech and other rights and that enables us to determine the
appropriate boundaries between them.
1. External Freedom
On the first and most basic level, individual freedom and dignity
support a right to control one’s own mind and body, free from unjustified
interference by others. This is a right that the Anglo-American legal
tradition calls personal security.212 This right provides a basis for the
liberties protected by the First Amendment, for the ability to control your
own mind and body includes the freedom to think as you like and to speak
as you think.213 At the same time, personal security includes the right to be
free from violence and the fear of violence. Speech invades this right
when it amounts to an assault, a threat, or an incitement to imminent
violence. These forms of speech also constitute a wrong against the
212
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *129–34 (St.
George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch & Small 1803).
213
See, e.g., St. George Tucker, Of the Right of Conscience; and of the Freedom of Speech and of
the Press, in id., app., note G, at 3–4, 11 (discussing the rights of personal opinion, speech, and
writing).

138

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:101

community as a whole, which has both a right and a duty to preserve the
public peace and to protect its citizens against violence.214 This right of the
community is also violated by “fighting words,” or those that tend to
provoke an immediate breach of the peace.
2. Internal Freedom
Personal security may be described as a form of external freedom—the
freedom of a person as an embodied being who exists in the world. In
turn, external freedom is rooted in the capacity for internal autonomy or
self-determination. This is the second level on which we can understand
the liberties protected by the First Amendment. Internal autonomy
includes the ability to determine one’s own thoughts, beliefs, and emotions
without unwarranted interference or compulsion, as well as to express
them outwardly through speech. By protecting these forms of autonomy,
the First Amendment seeks “to assure self-fulfillment for each
individual”215 and to promote the values of “individual dignity and choice”
upon which our constitutional order is based.216
On this level, First Amendment liberties protect what Justice Louis D.
Brandeis called the right to “an inviolate personality.”217 In addition to
freedom of speech and thought, this concept embraces a number of other
rights. First, just as individuals have a right to bodily integrity, they also
have a right to psychological integrity218—a right that is violated by
extreme and unwarranted attacks on their mental or emotional wellbeing.219 Second, the right to an inviolate personality is infringed by
speech or conduct that is profoundly insulting or degrading. Third, it is
violated by acts that invade one’s privacy, which serves to protect the
boundary between the self and the outside world. Finally, the right is
violated by unjustified attacks on one’s reputation, which constitutes the
social dimension of personality, or the self as it relates to others. These
rights to psychological integrity, personal dignity, privacy, and reputation
may be just as important for individual self-fulfillment as is free speech
itself.220
214
On this duty, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 509–10 (1991). For a defense of the claim that, in the
liberal tradition, communities as well as individuals can possess rights, see HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH,
supra note 166, at 40–42.
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Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).
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Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
217
Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
218
See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 113 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (discussing the rights to
physical and psychological integrity).
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2005) (discussing liability for outrageous conduct causing severe emotional disturbance).
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For a fuller exploration of these rights, see HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 166, at 54–59,
144–46, 149–63.
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3. Social, Political, and Cultural Freedom
While the first two forms of liberty regard individuals as separate and
independent, the third focuses on their relationships with one another.
Individuals use speech to interact with family members, friends, coworkers, and others in private life. Individuals also have a right to free
speech in the public or political realm. Negatively, this includes a right to
critically evaluate the conduct of the government, of public officials, and
of others who play a prominent role in our common life. And positively,
political freedom of speech allows citizens to discuss public policy and
other matters of common concern. Individuals also use speech to
contribute to the broader culture of the society.
In protecting these forms of speech, the First Amendment affirms the
freedom and dignity of individuals as social beings. At the same time, the
social nature of communication has important implications for our
understanding of free speech. When an individual speaks with others, she
is engaging not in a purely individual, self-regarding activity, but in a form
of interaction with others. This is true not only in private conversations but
also in the public realm, where citizens deliberate with one another on
public issues.221 Thus the right to communicate is what may be called a
relational right—a right to interact with others in a particular way or to
take part in a common activity. By their nature, relational rights must be
exercised in a way that respects the personality and rights of those with
whom one interacts. On this view, the freedom to engage in public
discourse does not give one a license to invade the rights of other people.
4. Intellectual and Spiritual Freedom
For the liberal tradition, our freedom and dignity are ultimately
grounded in our nature as intelligent beings. This points to a fourth kind of
liberty: the ability to engage in intellectual and spiritual activity in an effort
to gain a deeper understanding of ourselves and the world we live in, as
well as to express our sense of the meaning and value of existence. To the
extent that this is a purely individual activity, it should be protected so long
as it does not violate other rights. In many cases, however, intellectual or
spiritual activity is conducted together with other people. In those cases, it
presupposes mutual recognition and respect in the same way as other forms
of communication.
5. Free Speech and Equality
The concept of equality is also central to the liberal tradition.
Although individuals differ in many ways, they all have an equal claim to

221

See supra Part V.A.
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freedom and dignity. This is the positive meaning of equality.222 In
negative terms, equality means the right to be free from unwarranted
subordination and discrimination.223
The concept of equality plays an important role in contemporary First
Amendment jurisprudence. Because all individuals have an equal right to
free speech, the government is generally barred from favoring some
speakers or ideas over others.224 At the same time, speech can be restricted
when it amounts to a form of unlawful discrimination against others, as in
Gomez v. Hug225 and other cases arising under federal and state laws that
are designed to secure workplace equality.226
C. Conflicts of Rights
In the previous section, I showed that the same principles that justify
freedom of speech also give rise to other rights. Speech that unjustifiably
infringes these rights should not receive protection under the First
Amendment. In some cases, however, there is a substantial conflict
between free speech and other rights. In such cases, the law should
determine which of the rights, under the circumstances, is most important
from the standpoint of human freedom and dignity, the values that lie at the
foundation of all rights.
For an illustration of this point, we can look to the law of defamation.
The common law afforded strong protection to reputation by imposing a
kind of strict liability for false statements that damaged an individual’s
standing in the community.227 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,228 the
police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama relied on this traditional
doctrine to obtain a huge damages award against the Times for publishing a
political advertisement that allegedly accused him of harassing civil rights
activists in the South.229 The Supreme Court overturned the award on First
Amendment grounds. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan declared
that the right to criticize the official conduct of public officials is so vital to
democratic self-government that it should prevail over the official’s right
to reputation, except in cases where the statements at issue are knowingly
or recklessly false.230 At the same time, the majority rejected the position
that accusations against public officials are entitled to absolute protection
222
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under the First Amendment—a position that was taken by Justices Hugo L.
Black, William O. Douglas, and Arthur J. Goldberg.231 As Justice Brennan
later explained, “[t]he use of calculated falsehood” could be restrained
because it not only caused social harm but also was “at odds with the
premises of democratic government.”232
In subsequent cases, the Justices extended the New York Times rule to
suits by political candidates,233 as well as to suits by “public figures” who
play an influential role in the life of the community.234 However, in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,235 the Court concluded that applying the New York
Times rule to private-figure plaintiffs would unduly sacrifice the right to
reputation, a right that flows from “‘our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being.’”236 Under Gertz, states may
allow private figures who are defamed on matters of public concern to
recover for statements that are made without reasonable care.237 Finally, in
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,238 the Justices
indicated that a lower level of First Amendment protection applies to cases
in which a private figure is defamed on a matter of private concern.239 In
this series of cases, the Court has sought to achieve a sensitive
accommodation between the competing rights at stake.
D. The First Amendment and Content Neutrality
In addition to illuminating the boundaries between free speech and
other values, this discussion allows us to reassess the doctrine of content
neutrality. Writing for the Court in Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley,240 Justice Thurgood Marshall declared that “above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”241 As Chief Justice Warren E. Burger pointed out in a brief
concurrence, this was an obvious overstatement, for the Court has
continued to hold that some categories of speech, such as defamation,
fighting words, and obscenity, are not protected.242 Over the past four
decades, however, the doctrine of content neutrality has come to dominate
231
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First Amendment jurisprudence. In Snyder and many other cases, the
courts have resorted to this doctrine to grant First Amendment protection
without making any serious inquiry into the value of the speech at issue or
the harm that it causes to other values.243
From a liberal humanist perspective, we can see not only the appeal of
the content neutrality doctrine but also its limits. Individuals are
autonomous beings who must be free to determine the content of their own
thought and expression. As members of the political community, they also
have a right to engage in collective self-determination. The government
violates the autonomy of individuals or the community when it
unjustifiably interferes with the content of thought or expression. As we
have seen, however, the autonomy of individuals is limited by the rights of
others.244 In a liberal constitutional order, the community also is bound to
respect the rights of individuals. When the government regulates speech in
a way that is necessary to protect other rights, it does not violate the
autonomy of individuals or the community; instead, it simply fulfills its
fundamental duty to protect rights. It follows that, in cases where free
speech appears to conflict with other important rights, the courts should
engage in a careful consideration of the values on both sides, and should
not short-circuit this inquiry by invoking the content neutrality doctrine as
has been done in cases like Snyder.245
E. A Response to Some Objections
In this Part, I have argued that communication depends on mutual
recognition, and that this is true not only in the private but also in the
public sphere. It follows that individuals who participate in public
discourse have a duty to respect the personality and rights of others.
Speech that infringes those rights is wrongful and subject to regulation by
law, except in cases where the speech should be privileged because of its
overriding value for First Amendment purposes.
In point of fact, even contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence
recognizes some limits on public discourse—limits that serve at least in
part to protect the rights of other individuals and the community itself. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that even speech that relates to

243
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–80, 391 (1992) (using the doctrine to
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475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
244
See supra Part V.B.
245
For a fuller critique of the Court’s approach to content neutrality, see Steven J. Heyman,
Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647 (2002).

2012]

TO DRINK THE CUP OF FURY

143

matters of public concern may be restricted if it falls into the categories of
threats, incitement, or fighting words.246
In response, it might be said that these three doctrines protect only
against violence, not against injuries to personality. But that is not entirely
true. Consider the fighting words doctrine. In the classic formulation of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,247 that doctrine holds that words are
unprotected not only if they “tend to incite to an immediate breach of the
peace,” but also if they “inflict injury” “by their very utterance.” 248
Although the Justices have sometimes overlooked the second branch of the
definition,249 they have never overruled it.250 In any event, even if the
doctrine were confined to the first branch, it would still function in an
indirect way to deny First Amendment protection to insulting speech, since
that is one of the kinds of speech that most commonly leads to a breach of
the peace.
Moreover, there is another doctrine that clearly serves to protect
personality, and that is the law of defamation. As discussed above, even
when speech addresses matters of public concern, it is unprotected if it
intentionally or recklessly defames a public official or figure or if it
negligently defames a private figure.251 As the Court observed in Gertz,
these limits on public discourse are necessary to protect the right to
reputation, which is an essential aspect of individual “‘dignity and
worth.’”252
A critic of the liberal humanist view might respond that, to recover for
defamation, a plaintiff must show more than simply an affront to his
dignity: he must prove that the defendant made false statements of fact,
and that she did so with the requisite state of mind. In this way, the tort of
defamation has a basis in objective fact. By contrast, other claims of
emotional or dignity injury are merely subjective and exist in the eye of the
beholder. Whether a person is upset or offended by the speech or conduct
of others is largely within his own control. Moreover, as the old adage
about “sticks and stones” suggests, emotional and dignitary injuries are not
real in the way that physical harm is. For the same reasons, those injuries
are incapable of objective proof. In short, with the exception of
246
See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (threats); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
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defamation, emotional and dignitary injuries are too arbitrary, subjective,
insubstantial, and unverifiable to provide a principled basis for restricting
the freedom of speech.
However convincing this argument may seem in the abstract, it runs
directly contrary to common sense and experience. Consider Wilkinson v.
Downton,253 the seminal case that led to the development of the tort of
IIED. In that case, a woman suffered intense emotional distress after a
man falsely told her that her husband had been gravely injured in an
accident.254 In a situation like this, it cannot plausibly be argued that the
distress was within the woman’s own control, or that it did not constitute a
real and substantial injury, or that a jury would have any serious difficulty
determining whether it had occurred or not.
This example suggests that we need to develop a conception of the
person that is richer, deeper, and more consonant with experience than the
one that figures in the Supreme Court’s current approach. Although this is
not the place to develop such a conception in depth, it is possible to sketch
some of its main elements and to show how they justify legal protection
against emotional and dignitary harm.
As we have seen, human personality can be understood on several
different levels. To begin with, a person is an embodied being who exists
in the external world.255 As a matter of instinct as well as reason, she has a
deep concern with protecting her own life and bodily integrity. When
confronted with actual or threatened violence, she naturally experiences
fear or apprehension. At the same time, she may feel anger at being treated
as an inferior being who can be abused and dominated by others. These
are emotional and dignitary injuries, but no one doubts that the law may
and should protect individuals against them, even when they are caused by
speech.
On a second level, personality can be identified with the inner self. A
person has an internal life of thought, feeling, and experience. He has the
capacity to determine his own values and beliefs, to pursue them in his
personal life, to express himself to others, and to form personal
relationships. Thus, just as a person is concerned with protecting his own
bodily integrity, he is also concerned with protecting the integrity of his
inner self, of his personal life, of his self-expression, and of his
relationships with others. Speech or conduct that violates this integrity
naturally causes emotional and dignitary injury. As the Wilkinson case
253

[1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (Eng.).
Id. at 57.
255
See supra text accompanying notes 212–16 (discussing external and internal freedom). The
law uses person in this sense when it describes crimes like homicide, assault, and rape as “offenses
involving danger to the person.” See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL
DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 117 (1985).
254

2012]

TO DRINK THE CUP OF FURY

145

shows, there is nothing that is necessarily arbitrary, insubstantial, or
unprovable about such injuries.256 On the contrary, when a person is told
that someone that she deeply loves is gravely injured or dead, and when
she believes the statement to be true, it would be highly abnormal not to
experience intense grief and distress. Just as the capacity to love is part of
our conception of a person, so are the emotions that result from the loss of
a loved one. In this way, it is possible to give a reasoned account of
emotional reactions such as fear and grief and to show that they have a
solid basis in a conception of human personality.
In response, it might be said that however true this may be of
emotional reactions, it is not true of a sense of personal dignity, which is a
purely subjective notion that depends on the particular values that are held
by individuals or on the conventional standards that are accepted by a
certain community.257 But this is not the case. At the root of personal
dignity is a sense of one’s inherent value as a human being, which is
integral to the concept of personality. Thus, it is normal and appropriate
for individuals to have a sense of dignity and self-respect. When they are
subjected to speech or conduct that violates this sense—such as a barrage
of racial insults and abuse—they suffer a real and substantial injury.258
On a third level, a person is a member of the community and feels a
sense of belonging and attachment to it. Once again, speech or conduct
that denies this aspect of personality—such as a cross-burning that is
meant to drive a family out of the neighborhood—can cause serious injury.
And the same is true of speech or conduct that attacks a person’s status as
an intellectual and spiritual being—an injury that can be caused by
religious persecution or other oppression based on thought, conscience, or
belief.259
In short, human personality has a number of dimensions. A person’s
identity resides in his embodied self, in his inner self, in his private life, in
his social relationships, in his community membership, and in his
intellectual and spiritual life. When he suffers injury in any of these
capacities, it constitutes a wrong to his personality. In this way, we can
give a rational explanation of the nature of emotional and dignitary harm.
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I have suggested that the Supreme Court’s current approach to the First
Amendment is flawed because it lacks this sort of rich and complex
account of human personality. At times, however, the Court does appeal to
such an account. When the Justices discuss the values that underlie the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech, they speak in terms of
individual self-fulfillment,260 personal dignity,261 the political and cultural
life of the community,262 and intellectual and spiritual liberty.263 Of course,
these are the same values that I have discussed.264 From this point of view,
then, the problem with the Court’s approach is not that it lacks a rich
theory of personality, but that it applies that theory in a one-sided way by
using it only to explain why free speech should be protected, while failing
to recognize the ways in which the theory also supports other rights such as
privacy, dignity, and emotional well-being—rights which also deserve
protection under the law and which justify some limits on speech.
F. Other Theories of Public Discourse
Finally, it may be useful to contrast the liberal humanist approach with
two leading accounts of public discourse: Robert C. Post’s theory of free
speech and democracy and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s metaphor of
the marketplace of ideas.
1. Robert C. Post’s Theory of Free Speech and Democracy
The approach that Post takes is deeply informed by social theory. Post
maintains that constitutional principles like free speech apply differently in
different areas of social life.265 In particular, he distinguishes between two
domains that he calls community and democracy. For Post, a community is
“a social formation that inculcates norms into the very identities of its
members.”266 These norms, or “civility rules,” prescribe the respect that
individuals owe one another.267 Traditionally, the law has enforced these
norms by regulating communication as well as conduct, for example
through “such communicative torts as defamation, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”268 “Through these torts,” Post
explains, “the common law not only protects the integrity of the
personality of individual community members, but also serves
See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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authoritatively to articulate a community’s norms and hence to define a
community’s identity.”269
The domain of democracy embodies a very different conception of
individuals: instead of being formed by social norms, they are viewed as
autonomous beings who are capable of “choos[ing] the forms of their
communal life” through public discussion and democratic selfgovernance.270 It follows that, while it is appropriate for the law to enforce
civility rules in the ordinary life of the community, the enforcement of
those rules must be “suspended” within the sphere of democracy in order
to “open the space of public discourse” and thereby make individuals as
free as possible to engage in “collective self-constitution.”271
In this way, Post offers a highly sophisticated defense of contemporary
First Amendment jurisprudence, which holds that the law generally may
not regulate public discourse to protect individual dignity and personality.
There are two difficulties with Post’s view, however. First, it does not
provide a fully adequate account of the preconditions of public discourse.
As I have argued, in addition to the exchange of information, ideas, and so
on, communication involves an underlying relationship between the
participants—a relationship that is ultimately founded on mutual
recognition.272 And this is true not only of personal conversations but also
of democratic deliberation.273 People can engage in collective selfdetermination only if they view themselves as a group with a shared
identity, and this is possible only when they recognize one another as
persons and members of the group.
It follows that democratic deliberation depends on mutual recognition.
Some statements that Post makes seem to reflect this idea. For example,
he follows Jean Piaget in holding that democracy is founded on “‘the
mutual respect of autonomous wills.’”274 It is unclear, however, how this
idea can be squared with Post’s position that the law’s protections for
individual dignity and personality must be suspended within the realm of
public discourse.

269

Id.
Id.
271
Id. at 120, 144, 149, 301, 330. In his recently published Rosenthal Lectures, Post succinctly
summarizes his position as follows: “Within public discourse, the First Amendment requires law to
respect the autonomy of speakers rather than to protect the targets of speech; outside public discourse,
the First Amendment permits the state to control the autonomy of speakers in order to protect the
dignity of the targets of speech.” ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 24 (2012).
272
See supra Part V.A.
273
Id.
274
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 257, at 187–88, 299 (quoting JEAN PIAGET, THE
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 366 (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1932)).
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The second problem with Post’s view is that it draws too sharp a
distinction between the public and private aspects of personality.275 For
Post, the democratic sphere is based on respect for individuals as
autonomous beings who are capable of engaging in self-government, not
on respect for individuals in their private capacities. But the self cannot
reasonably be divided up in this way. The person who actively participates
in the political realm is the same person who has a claim to respect for her
bodily integrity, her personal dignity, her private life, her reputation, her
personal and family relationships, and her intellectual and spiritual life. It
would hardly be logical for one to claim to respect another individual as a
self-governing citizen but to deny her respect in every other way. Thus,
there is no good reason to hold that the First Amendment should protect
public speech no matter how seriously it violates other rights such as
privacy, reputation, dignity, and emotional well-being.
Of course, this does not mean that the law should be allowed to restrict
speech whenever it conflicts with or criticizes the particular beliefs, values,
or sense of identity held by an individual or group. For the liberal
tradition, individuals have no right to be shielded from ideas with which
they disagree. Instead, they should be open to the views of other people
and willing to critically examine and reassess their own beliefs.276 But it
does not follow that speakers should have carte blanche to invade the
personality rights of others. As we have seen, those rights are not merely
arbitrary or conventional; instead, at their core, they reflect our conception
of the dignity that inheres in every person.
It is also true, as Post argues, that the particular legal rights that
individuals have are determined through democratic debate and selfgovernance. Thus, citizens must be free to argue that the laws that define
individual rights should be reformed.277 However, it is one thing to argue
for a change in (say) the law of privacy, and another thing to engage in
speech that violates the rights of a particular individual as recognized by
existing law. Our commitment to democratic self-governance does not
require us to grant blanket protection to speech of that sort.278
275
In this respect, his position resembles that of Meiklejohn, who insists that every person has two
“radically different” capacities—his capacity as a citizen who has “a part to play in the governing of the
nation,” and his capacity “as an individual or as a member of some private group,” who “is rightly
pursuing his own advantage.” MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 192, at 80.
276
See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859)
(discussing the liberty of thought and discussion).
277
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 257, at 120, 151.
278
At first glance, Post’s theory clearly seems to support the result in Snyder. The issue is more
complex than it appears, however. While Post holds that the legal enforcement of civility rules must be
suspended in public discourse, he also observes that there are situations in which our commitment to
democratic deliberation may be superseded by “other competing commitments, such as those entailed
in the dignity of the socially situated self, in the importance of group identity, or in the necessary
exercise of community authority.” POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 257, at 174 (citations
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2. Justice Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas
In this Part, I have argued that personality should play a central role in
First Amendment jurisprudence. While Post unduly narrows that role,
Justice Holmes sought to do away with it altogether. In his writings both
on and off the bench, Justice Holmes rejected the ideas of natural rights
and human dignity which had provided the traditional American
justification for freedom of speech.279 Initially, he took the view that free
speech should receive no more protection from legislative majorities than
any other form of liberty.280 As he struggled to decide a series of cases
arising from political persecution during the First World War, he came to
change his mind, but he made no effort to return to the traditional rationale.
Instead, in his powerful dissent in Abrams v. United States,281 Justice
Holmes argued that while “persecution” is a “perfectly logical” way for
people to pursue their goals, “the ultimate good” that they desire “is better
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.”282

omitted). In such cases, the courts must determine where the boundary should be drawn between the
domain of public discourse and the domain of community. Id. at 174–77. Post also recognizes that,
paradoxically, “our conception of rational reflection and deliberation itself depends upon the
observance of civility rules.” Id. at 146. Speech that violates these rules “is likely to be experienced as
violent and coercive” as well as “irrational or valueless.” Id. at 146. Thus, in extreme cases, the law
may need to enforce civility rules for the sake of public discourse itself. Id. at 301.
In these ways, Post’s theory is rich and complex enough to allow for differing positions on the
issue of funeral picketing. Although one can argue that this is a classic situation in which the legal
protections for personality must be suspended to promote democratic deliberation, one can also argue
that funeral picketing goes beyond the appropriate bounds of public discourse and thus may be
regulated to protect the community’s norms of privacy, dignity, and civility.
However, while Post’s theory does not foreclose arguments of the latter kind, it regards them as
problematic because they seek to restrict public discourse on the basis of the values held by particular
communities. Id. at 177. For this reason, Post seems to recognize a presumption against allowing
“ideological regulation” in such cases. Id. Courts that follow this view are likely to reject particular
limits on expression, as the Supreme Court did in Snyder. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy
and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 484 (2011) (observing that the holding in Snyder is “explicitly
base[d]” on the notion that the protesters’ speech “should . . . be regarded as part of the formation of
democratic public opinion”). It follows that Post’s theory is subject to the same objections discussed in
Part IV.B: it tends to unduly sacrifice the values of individual dignity and personality as well as to
undermine the conditions for legitimate public debate. For a fuller critique of Post’s view, see
HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 166, at 174–77, 276 n.56.
279
Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy of Justice Holmes for First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 674 (2011) [hereinafter Heyman, Dark
Side].
280
See id. at 675–79.
281
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
282
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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This passage suggests that the protection of free speech will promote
the common good. As Justice Holmes’s other writings make clear,
however, he did not believe that there is such a thing as the common good.
Instead, he held that the community is made up of different groups (such as
employers and workers), each of which has its own interests and beliefs.283
Social life is a Darwinian “struggle for life” in which each group seeks to
promote its own good at the expense of other groups.284 In this way,
human life is governed by force in the same way as all other phenomena.285
Against this background, Justice Holmes’s defense of free speech
appears in a rather different light. What he calls “the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”286 is a function not
only of the intrinsic merit of an idea, but also, and above all, of its capacity
to embody the views of the most powerful group within the society. 287 As
he put the point in Gitlow v. New York,288 the function or “meaning of free
speech” is to determine which beliefs are destined “in the long run . . . to
be accepted by the dominant forces of the community.”289
Thus, Justice Holmes understood freedom of speech in terms of power.
Speech is one of the most important ways in which groups seek to attain a
dominant position within the society, a position that allows them to
promote their own interests and beliefs and to impose them on other
groups. Of course, this understanding of free speech is far removed from
notions of respect for the personality and rights of others. In addition to
rejecting the idea of human dignity, Justice Holmes held that the interests
of individuals may and should be sacrificed whenever necessary to
promote the larger interests of the society—in this case, the interests that
are served by the marketplace of ideas.290
A strong echo of this Holmesian view can be heard in the Snyder case.
At the end of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts writes:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them
to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict
great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that
pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen

283
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Gas-Stokers’ Strike, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 323, 324–25 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (arguing that an “identity of interest
between the different parts of a community” does not exist).
284
Id. at 325.
285
See Heyman, Dark Side, supra note 279, at 692.
286
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
287
See Heyman, Dark Side, supra note 279, at 690–95.
288
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
289
Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
290
See Heyman, Dark Side, supra note 279, at 674, 706–08.
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a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.291
In this way, Chief Justice Roberts, like Justice Holmes, understands
speech in terms of “power[].”292 A serious problem with this approach is
that it allows people to use speech to abuse and dominate others.
Arguably, that is what Westboro does when it pickets funerals. At bottom,
funeral picketing is a form of bullying directed against the grieving
families.293 In the next Part, I consider whether this behavior should
receive protection under the First Amendment.
VI. APPLYING THE LIBERAL HUMANIST APPROACH TO FUNERAL
PICKETING IN ITS PARADIGMATIC FORM
How would the liberal humanist approach apply to Westboro’s funeral
picketing? The best way to address this question is to begin with a
paradigmatic case of funeral picketing, that is, a case in which the
protesters are able to stand close enough to communicate directly with the
family and mourners. A striking example may be found in the funeral of
Army Spc. Edward Myers, who was killed in Iraq and buried after a
service held at Grace Evangelical Church in St. Joseph, Missouri, in
August 2005.294 Westboro’s members stood along the highway directly
across from the church, holding bright neon-colored signs bearing many of
the same slogans as in Snyder.295 As the soldier’s mother, Charlotte
Myers-Dicks, recently recalled, “The combat vets . . . were on one side of
the road . . . , the Westboro Baptist Church was on the other side of the
road, and we drove right in between them.”296 She continued: “I’ve heard
every word they said at my son’s funeral. I read every sign. They were
specifically targeting my son. Those are memories you just don’t
forget.”297
In this Part, I argue that when funeral picketing has this kind of direct
impact on the family and mourners, it violates their rights to emotional
well-being, dignity, privacy, and religious liberty, as well as the
community’s right to protect the dignity of human life and death. To this
end, I first explore the nature of the grief caused by the death itself, as well
291

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
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See Sacks, supra note 16, at 200–03.
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Phelps’ Group Protests at Soldier’s Funeral, KMBC.COM (Aug. 5, 2005, 6:54 AM),
http://www.kmbc.com/Phelps-Group-Protests-At-Soldier-s-Funeral/-/11664900/12246900/-/50vy75z//index.html.
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Grieving Mom Saddened by Westboro Ruling, KMBC.COM (Mar. 2, 2011), http://news.yahoo.
com/video/politics-15749652/grieving-mom-saddened-by-westboro-ruling-24391485.html (video).
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Id. at 0:53–1:01.
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as how the funeral and other forms of consolation respond to this grief. I
then address the ways in which Westboro’s funeral picketing increases this
grief and interferes with the process of mourning. Finally, I consider
whether the picketing nevertheless should be protected because of its value
as political or religious expression. After discussing the paradigmatic case
of funeral picketing in this Part, we shall be in a position to consider the
particular facts of Snyder in Part VII.
A. The Grief Caused by the Death Itself
As Chief Justice Roberts observed in Snyder, the legal term “emotional
distress” does not fully capture what family members suffer in a situation
like this.298 We need to unpack this term to have a sense of the grief
caused by the death itself and of the ways in which it can be exacerbated
by the Westboro picketing.
Of course, the response that one has to the death of a loved one is
deeply personal and to some extent unique. Nevertheless, we can identify
some of the most basic reactions that are commonly experienced by the
mourners or survivors—terms that I shall use to refer to the parents,
children, spouse or partner, and other close relatives and friends of the
deceased.
Perhaps the most basic response mourners have is grief for the
deceased herself—for the pain or fear that she may have suffered, for the
fact that she has lost her life, and for all the things that she will never be
able to do in the future. Of course, these reactions will be especially strong
if the deceased was relatively young and was cut down before her time.
The manner of her death may also cause grief and shock to those she has
left behind, particularly if it was sudden or unexpected or involved
violence. When parents lose a child, they may also experience a sense of
guilt that they have failed to protect her.
In addition to the sorrow they feel for the deceased, the mourners feel
sorrow for themselves. The relationship that you have with a parent or a
child, a spouse or a partner or a close friend, becomes part of your own
identity. When that person dies, you lose a part of yourself as well. At the
same time, you are forced to confront the reality of death and of your own
mortality.
In these ways, the loss of a loved one may have an existential impact
on those who are left behind. The experience may undermine their sense
of the meaning and value of life. As an Iraq war widow named Kelly
Franz put it, when she learned that her husband Lucas had died “all the

298

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217–18 (2011).
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color drained out of the world.”
The death can also challenge the
survivors’ religious faith and their sense that there is a loving God who
cares about them.
Funerals and other forms of mourning are intended to respond to these
various and ramified sorts of grief. These rituals are meant to remember
the deceased, to express love and respect for him, and to recognize the
significance of his life. They are also meant to console the mourners by
showing affection, support, and solidarity. At the same time, these rituals
reaffirm the meaning and value of life in the face of death.300
299

B. The Impact of Westboro’s Funeral Picketing
1. Freedom from Severe Emotional Distress
Should Westboro’s funeral picketing, in its paradigmatic form, be
protected under a liberal humanist approach to the First Amendment? At
the outset, it is critical to recognize that Westboro specifically intends its
conduct to increase the mourners’ grief and to counteract the consolation
that they receive from the funeral. In its picketing, Westboro celebrates the
death and, in the case of soldiers and murder victims, the violence that
brought it about.301 In addition, while the mourners seek to affirm the
value of their loved one and his life, the protesters repudiate that value.
Instead, they declare that God has killed him and condemned him to hell in
order to punish him, his family, or the community for their sinfulness.302
In the funeral and other expressions of support, members of the community
show their love and concern for the family; by contrast, the protest often
seeks to hold the deceased and his family up to the contempt of the
community.303 The funeral asserts the value of life in the midst of death;
the protesters proclaim that all human beings deserve to suffer death and
damnation—and that, apart from a tiny remnant of the elect, they all
will.304
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FALL FROM GRACE (Docurama Films 2007). A powerful lament on the death of a friend by the
poet W.H. Auden ends:
The stars are not wanted now: put out every one;
Pack up the moon and dismantle the sun;
Pour away the ocean and sweep up the wood.
For nothing now can ever come to any good.
W.H. AUDEN, Funeral Blues, in ANOTHER TIME: POEMS BY W.H. AUDEN 78 (1940).
300
For a good discussion of mourning rituals and the ways that Westboro’s picketing interferes
with them, see Mathis Rutledge, supra note 16, at 304–11.
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See supra text accompanying notes 91–95.
302
See supra text accompanying notes 91–112.
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As we have seen, these messages are not merely intended for the
public at large. Instead, when Westboro pickets a funeral, one of its
primary goals is to communicate these messages to the mourners
themselves, and, in the paradigmatic case, the protesters stand close
enough to do so. It seems clear that speech of this kind, when directed
toward people who have just lost a loved one, is capable of causing severe
emotional distress.305 Moreover, that is exactly what Westboro intends to
do. As Rebekah Phelps-Davis explained at the Snyder trial, Westboro’s
signs contain “hard-hitting language” that is “designed to strike the heart of
anyone who reads it.”306 As the jury found, this conduct easily meets the
requirements for IIED. In the terms I have used, the picketing violates the
mourners’ right to psychological integrity, or the right to be free from
severe and unwarranted invasions of their emotional well-being.307
2. Privacy
When people go to a funeral, especially when they were close to the
deceased, they are intensely focused on remembering and expressing their
love for her. When Westboro appears at the funeral and, in the
paradigmatic case, forces the mourners to view signs that condemn the
deceased and celebrate her death, they are bound to experience this
conduct as a gross intrusion into their personal lives. In this way, the
conduct infringes their right to privacy.
In response, it may be said that individuals can protect themselves
from unwanted expression simply by “‘averting [their] eyes.’”308 However
true this may be in other situations, Westboro seeks to confront others in a
way that is impossible to ignore. As Timothy Phelps has explained,
“Nobody looks at our signs or hears our words without immediately having
to take a position—immediately.”309
It may also be said that a funeral is not a purely private affair.310 The
time and place of the event may be published in the newspaper; many
people may attend; there may be a procession through the streets of the
community; and, when the death has resulted from a war or some other
well-known catastrophe, there may even be a degree of media coverage.

305
For a moving account of the impact that family members suffer when they are confronted by
the Westboro protesters standing nearby, see FALL FROM GRACE, supra note 299, at 1:00:16 (interview
with Kelly Franz).
306
Record, supra note 59, at 1951 (opening statement of Rebekah Phelps-Davis).
307
See supra text accompanying notes 218–19.
308
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 211 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
309
FALL FROM GRACE, supra note 299, at 17:25 (remarks of Timothy Phelps).
310
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 2–6, 37–38, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No.
09-751) [hereinafter Westboro Brief].
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I grant that many funerals have a public dimension, and that this is true
of most of the funerals that Westboro chooses to picket. But I would make
three points in response. First, the terms private and public do not refer to
clear and distinct categories but rather are situated on a continuum. While
the funeral of a major public figure may be a highly public event, the
funeral of an ordinary person lies much closer to the private end of the
spectrum.
Second, the concept of privacy is a qualitative one, which is used to
mark the boundary around an area of life that is reserved to a particular
person or group of people. An outsider who unjustifiably intrudes into this
realm may be said to invade the privacy of the people within, regardless of
whether they are a small group such as a family or a larger one such as a
political organization. For example, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,311 the Supreme Court held that the State of Alabama had no
power to compel a civil rights organization to turn over its membership
lists because that would violate a right to associational privacy. 312
Although the internal life of the group may be public for its members,
outsiders infringe the group’s privacy when they intrude into that life.
The third and most important point has to do with how one conceives
of funerals. It may be that there are societies in which an individual is
regarded as having value not so much for her own sake as for her role in
the community. In such societies, the funeral may focus on the community
itself and the contributions that the deceased made to it. But that is not the
way that funerals are ordinarily understood in our society. With the
possible exception of those held for major public figures, the focus of a
funeral is on the life and the value of the deceased herself. In this sense,
the funeral is a deeply personal event. At the center of that event is the
person who has died, then her family and close friends, and then other
friends and members of the community. Thus, even when many members
of the community attend the funeral of a private person, it would be a
mistake to view it as essentially a public event that should be treated in the
same manner as, say, a political rally. At the heart of the event is the
expression of love and respect for the deceased. When someone who has
no personal connection with or concern for the deceased approaches the
funeral and seeks to inject a broader religious or political message into it—
and still more when the message is one that condemns the mourners and
the deceased herself—this constitutes a blatant intrusion into the mourners’
personal lives and thus invades their right to privacy.313
311

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Id. at 462.
313
At times, Westboro has engaged in expression that is even more profoundly intrusive and
hurtful. For example, in March 1993, two days after a young musician named Kevin Oldham died of
complications from AIDS, his parents received an envelope in the mail from the church. Believing it to
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3. Personal Dignity
Funeral picketing also has an impact on personal dignity. Most
clearly, this is the dignity of the deceased himself. Some philosophers,
such as Immanuel Kant, hold that the right to dignity is one that survives a
person’s death,314 and some contemporary legal systems take the same
view.315 Although American law does not do so, it does recognize a
number of dignitary rights on the part of the family of the deceased. In
cases where his corpse has been mistreated, his family may be able to
recover for the torts of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress.316 In other situations, the family may be able to assert a right to
privacy. For example, in National Archives and Records Administration v.
Favish,317 the Supreme Court held that photographs of a suicide victim’s
body were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
because that would “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.”318 As Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote, “Family members
have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief,
tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased
person who was once their own.”319
Justice Kennedy’s statement applies just as forcefully to Westboro’s
funeral picketing in cases where protestors succeed in communicating
directly with grieving family members. This conduct violates the
mourners’ right to protect the dignity of the deceased. Moreover, because
the community is founded on respect for human life, the picketing may
also be regarded as a wrong against the community itself.
4. Religious or Spiritual Freedom
In addition to being a deeply personal event, a funeral is often a deeply
religious or spiritual one. At the funeral, the mourners seek consolation for
their loss and reaffirm their faith in the midst of tragedy and death.
be an expression of sympathy, they opened it and were shocked to find a flier denouncing their son as
“a filthy dead sodomite.” Grieving Family Forced to Deal with Phelps, THE TOPEKA CAPITOLJOURNAL (Aug. 3, 1994), http://cjonline.com/indepth/phelps/stories/080394_phelps06.shtml.
314
See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *295 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
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See, e.g., EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY
AND THE UNITED STATES 98–99, 117–18& nn. 100, 102 (2002) (discussing German law, which
protects a person’s reputation even after his death).
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See KEETON ET AL., supra note 227, at 63, 362; Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar,
Death, Grief, and Freedom of Speech: Does the First Amendment Permit Protection Against the
Harassment and Commandeering of Funeral Mourners?, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 368, 377–
79 (discussing cases where emotional distress results from the mishandling of dead bodies).
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541 U.S. 157 (2004).
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Westboro invades their right to religious or spiritual freedom when it
attempts to seize their attention in order to deepen their grief and condemn
their beliefs.
C. The Value of Funeral Picketing
Thus, in its paradigmatic form, Westboro’s funeral picketing infringes
the mourners’ rights by inflicting severe emotional and dignitary injury,
invading their privacy, and interfering with their religious or spiritual
freedom. Yet this is only the first part of the analysis. Under the liberal
humanist approach, we must go on and ask whether, from a First
Amendment perspective, the value of the speech is so great that it should
be regarded as privileged despite the injury that it causes.320 In considering
this question, we must remember that Westboro’s picketing is directed to
two different audiences: the mourners themselves and the public at large.321
Thus, we should ask: (1) whether the First Amendment gives Westboro a
right to communicate its message to the mourners at a funeral; and (2)
whether the amendment gives Westboro a right to communicate with the
public by standing so close to a funeral that the group’s message is also
effectively communicated to the mourners.
1. Should Westboro Have a First Amendment Right to Communicate
with the Mourners?
Although the liberal humanist approach holds that speakers generally
must respect the rights of others, it recognizes that some First Amendment
cases involve substantial conflicts between free speech and other rights. In
such cases, a court should determine which of the competing rights is more
important under the circumstances. To make this determination, the court
should look to the values that provide the justification both for free speech
and for other rights. In other words, the court should ask which of the
rights, under the circumstances, is most important for external freedom, for
individual autonomy and self-realization, for participation in the social,
political, and cultural life of the community, and for the pursuit of
intellectual and spiritual truth. The ultimate question is which of the
competing rights has the greatest value from the standpoint of human
freedom and dignity, the principles which lie at the basis of all rights.322
At the same time, this balancing of rights comes with an important
caveat: an asserted right can derive no value from its negation of another
right. For example, if making false and defamatory statements about a
person is wrongful because it invades his right to reputation, the speaker
320
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cannot contend that the speech should be privileged simply because she
derives self-fulfillment from degrading the other person in this way.
With this background, we are now in a position to determine whether
the Westboro protesters should have a right to communicate their message
to the mourners at a funeral. The first task is to identify the nature and
value of Westboro’s speech. In Snyder, the majority suggested that this
speech is basically political in nature.323 That is certainly not how
Westboro’s members conceive of it, however. Instead, they regard
themselves as preaching a religious message of divine wrath.324 At the
same time, of course, this message also bears on political issues such as the
nation’s stance on homosexuality.
As a general matter, people should have a right to proclaim their
religious and political views to the world. But the question we are
considering here is whether outsiders have a right to proclaim those views
to the mourners at a funeral. The answer clearly is no. The mourners are
already engaged in the activity of remembering and grieving over a loved
one, an activity that is deeply personal and spiritual. In this situation, no
one should have a right to intrude into their lives by forcing them to listen
to someone else’s religious or political message. And that is even more
true when the message consists of a condemnation of the mourners
themselves and the person whom they have lost.
In response, Westboro would insist that its preaching is a “loving act,”
and that it seeks to communicate with the mourners for their own good. 325
This assertion is difficult to credit. After all, Westboro’s members believe
that almost everyone they speak to has already been condemned to hell,
and that is the message that they communicate.326 In any event, if the law
is to respect the autonomy of the mourners, it must allow them to decide
for themselves whether their well-being will be promoted by listening to
Westboro’s message. To be sure, granting the church members the right to
picket would promote their own autonomy and self-fulfillment.327 But
individuals have no right to pursue those values when they are defined in
such a way as to deny the autonomy and self-fulfillment of others. That is
clearly the case in this situation.
323
324

See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011); supra text accompanying note 23.
As Westboro wrote in 2005:
[W]e’re the prophets of God. We don’t care who’s in office; we don’t care about
your politics; we don’t care about your policies on the war. . . . All of that is
irrelevant to us. The simple fact of the matter is . . . [that this war] is the means by
which God is punishing America, and nothing is going to change that fact.

Westboro, Message to Lawmakers, supra note 90, at 3.
325
Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 231–33.
326
See supra text accompanying notes 73–83.
327
See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 n.245 (2011).
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2. Should Westboro Have a First Amendment Right to Communicate
with the Public in a Way That Also Directly Impacts the
Mourners?
For these reasons, we should not say that the First Amendment gives
Westboro a right to communicate with the mourners at a funeral
themselves. But Westboro also preaches to the public at large. Does that
provide a good reason for holding that the picketing is protected by the
First Amendment?
Of course, if the picketing were directed solely to the public, there
would be a much stronger case for constitutional protection.328 But the
question under discussion is a different one: whether the picketers’ First
Amendment right to communicate with the public should give them a right
to stand so close to a funeral that they are also communicating directly
with the mourners. When the question is posed in this way, the answer is
clear. What draws so much public attention to this form of picketing is the
fact that Westboro is confronting the mourners and telling them that they
and their loved one are going to hell. In this way, the publicity and
attention that is generated by the picketing derives from the very thing that
makes it wrongful in the first place—the emotional and dignity injury that
it inflicts on the mourners.
Even in this situation, signs like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “Thank God for IEDs”
might be quite hurtful to the families of those killed in the wars. However, if those messages were
addressed only to the public—and if they did not attack specific individuals—the impact on the
families would not seem serious enough to speak of a violation of their rights. And even if one did, the
effect on those rights would be outweighed by the value of the speech as a form of participation in
public discussion.
One could also argue that Westboro’s picketing should be held unprotected as a form of hate
speech. Elsewhere, I have argued that, under the liberal humanist approach, some forms of hate speech
should be denied constitutional protection on the ground that they violate their targets’ rights to
personality, citizenship, and equality, as well as the most fundamental right of all—the right to be
recognized and treated as a human being and a member of the community. See HEYMAN, FREE
SPEECH, supra note 166, ch. 10. Of course, a great deal of Westboro’s speech expresses a virulent form
of hatred toward gay and lesbian people. The group dehumanizes them by routinely equating them
with animals. See Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 235 n.685 (recounting rhetoric used by Westboro
members against gay men and women such as “beasts” and “brutes”). It displays signs that proclaim
that “Fags are Worthy of Death,” and holds that they should suffer the death penalty. See FALL FROM
GRACE, supra note 299, at 11:41; Westboro Baptist Church, All Nations Must Immediately Outlaw
Sodomy (Homosexuality) & Impose the Death Penalty!, GODHATESFAGS (Dec. 3, 2002),
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/archive/20021203_outlaw-sodomy.pdf (last visited July 30, 2012).
It is hardly surprising that organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center classify Westboro as a
hate group. See Westboro Baptist Church, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/groups/westboro-baptist-church (last visited
July 30, 2012) (describing Westboro as “arguably the most obnoxious and rabid hate group in
America”).
I believe that, in some situations, it would be perfectly reasonable to hold Westboro’s expression
unprotected as a form of hate speech. In this Article, however, I shall not pursue the question of
whether, and under what circumstances, hate speech should be excluded from First Amendment
protection.
328
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To put it another way, when rights conflict, the liberal humanist
approach seeks to protect both of them as much as possible. In this
situation, that means that while Westboro should be allowed to
communicate its message to the public, it should not be allowed to do so in
a way that unnecessarily inflicts serious injury to the mourners, a group
with whom Westboro should not have a constitutional right to
communicate.
D. Conclusion
In this Part, I have argued that the First Amendment should not protect
the paradigmatic form of funeral picketing, in which the protesters stand so
close to the funeral that they are able to communicate their message
directly to the mourners as well as to the public in general. In Snyder, the
Justices did not discuss whether this form of picketing is entitled to
constitutional protection. Instead, they carefully avoided the issue and
stressed that their decision was a “narrow” one “limited by the particular
facts” of the case.329 It is reasonable to suppose that they did so because
they recognized that this form of funeral picketing would present a very
different case, and that it might not be entitled to constitutional protection.
Yet the Court said very little to explain why this case would be different.
By contrast, the liberal humanist approach offers a language and a
framework that show why the First Amendment’s protection should not
extend to this form of expression: it violates the mourners’ rights to
emotional well-being, privacy, dignity, and religious liberty, and while the
protesters do have a First Amendment right to communicate with the
public in general, they can do so in a way that does not cause such serious
injury to the mourners themselves.
VII. APPLYING THE LIBERAL HUMANIST APPROACH TO THE FACTS OF
SNYDER
A. Was Westboro’s Picketing Entitled to First Amendment Protection?
Now that we have considered the paradigmatic case of funeral
picketing, let us return to the facts of Snyder v. Phelps itself. Chief Justice
Roberts stressed that “Westboro stayed well away from the memorial
service”; that Albert Snyder could not read the signs as he was driven to
the funeral; that the signs were predominantly directed to addressing public
issues, not to attacking the Snyder family; and that “there is no indication
that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service itself.”330

329
330

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
Id. at 1216–17, 1220.
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If one views the facts in this way, then Snyder is a fairly easy case for
First Amendment protection even under the liberal humanist approach.
However, if one also takes account of other facts disclosed by the record,
this conclusion is more debatable. In its news release, Westboro
announced that it would “picket [the] funeral of Lance Cpl. Matthew A.
Snyder . . . at St. John’s Catholic” church331—not, as the Court would have
it, that Westboro merely planned to hold a demonstration that would
“coincide with Matthew Snyder’s funeral.”332 The protesters were allowed
to stand exactly where they had requested, at the main entrance to the
church campus.333 Thus, as Justice Alito observed, the protesters
“approached [the church] as closely as they could without trespassing.” 334
The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the demonstrators,
and Albert Snyder saw the tops of the picket signs, although he could not
read what was written on them.335
As Westboro’s members explained before, during, and after the
protest, the signs they displayed—such as “America is Doomed,” “God
Hates Fags,” “Fag Troops,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “God Hates
You,” and “You’re Going to Hell”336—were intended to condemn not only
the nation as a whole but also Matthew Snyder and his family in particular.
Those signs were meant to assert that Matthew was a “fag” in the sense
that he had voluntarily chosen “to fight for the United States of Sodom”;337
that God had killed him to punish him and his parents for their “evil,
wicked, and sinful manner of life”;338 that “[h]e died in shame, not honor,
for a fag nation cursed by God”;339 and that he was “[n]ow in Hell.”340
Albert Snyder could not read the signs at the time of funeral itself, but he
did see them an hour or two later, during the wake, when someone turned
on the television, and again the next morning, when the protest was
splashed across the front page of newspaper.341 The jury found that
Westboro’s picketing, together with its subsequent attack on the family on
the Internet, invaded his privacy and caused him to suffer severe emotional
distress—findings that Westboro did not dispute on appeal.342
When all of the facts are taken into account, it becomes clear that, in
contrast to the paradigmatic case of funeral picketing, Snyder is a very
331

Westboro, News Release, supra note 95.
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
333
See supra text accompanying notes 57–61.
334
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).
335
Id. at 1213 (majority opinion).
336
Id. at 1216–17.
337
Epic, supra note 96, at 3791; see Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–17 (describing the signs).
338
Epic, supra note 96, at 3791.
339
Westboro, News Release, supra note 95.
340
Id.
341
See Record, supra note 59, at 2072, 2075, 2078, 2085, 2088 (testimony of Albert Snyder).
342
See supra text accompanying notes 159–60.
332

162

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:101

difficult, borderline case. On one hand, Westboro should have a First
Amendment right to communicate its message on public issues to the
community at large. On the other hand, Westboro should not be permitted
to communicate a hateful message to the family at this time, for that would
violate the family’s own rights to privacy, dignity, emotional well-being,
and religious liberty. The question is where we should draw the line
between these two sets of rights.
When the issue is posed in this way, it is tempting to focus on whether
Westboro was communicating with the family directly. On this view, the
protesters should not have a right to stand so close to the mourners that
they are forced to see or hear the group’s message. As long as the
protesters stand further away, however, the First Amendment should
protect Westboro’s right to communicate with the public.
The difficulty with this position is that it disregards both the intent and
the effect of Westboro’s picketing, as well as the realities of modern
communication. As Pastor Phelps testified, he and his followers believe
that they have a duty to preach their message of God’s wrath “to every
creature,” including the mourners at funerals.343 Presumably, Westboro’s
members set up their picket at the main entrance to the church campus in
hopes of being able to convey their message directly to the family. They
were unable to do so only because the clergy decided to reroute the
procession through a different entrance and because the service was held at
a sanctuary that happened to be on the opposite side of the campus.344 And
even though Matthew’s father did not see or hear the message at the time,
he did see and hear it within a matter of hours.345
Thus, Westboro intended to convey its message to the family, and it
succeeded in conveying that message. Under these circumstances, it
hardly seems decisive that the message was communicated not in a direct
way but rather by means of coverage on television and in the newspaper—
media that, as Westboro surely knew, were substantially certain to bring
the message home to the family.346

343

Record, supra note 59, at 2215, 2226 (testimony of Fred Phelps Sr.).
See supra text accompanying notes 61–63.
345
See supra text accompanying notes 120–25.
346
In this connection, it is instructive to compare some other instances of unprotected speech. For
example, in Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 2637 (2003), members of a radical anti-abortion group held a news
conference at which they unveiled “Wanted” posters that amounted to death threats against thirteen
physicians who performed abortions. The physicians were also featured on a threatening website
maintained by the group. The activists were convicted of making unlawful threats in violation of the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1), and their convictions were
upheld by the court of appeals, which ruled that the speech was unprotected under the First Amendment
“true threats” doctrine. Id. at 1063. As this case illustrates, threatening speech can cause serious injury
and fall outside the First Amendment’s protection even when the speakers do not communicate directly
344
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B. The Vagueness of the Tort Doctrines Employed in Snyder
For these reasons, I am inclined to disagree with the majority’s holding
that the picketing in Snyder was entitled to substantive protection under the
First Amendment. On another critical issue, however, I believe the
majority is on solid ground.
To recover for the common law tort of IIED, Albert Snyder had to
prove “that the defendant[s], intentionally or recklessly, engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct that caused [him] to suffer severe
emotional distress.”347 If a state enacted a statute in those terms, it surely
would be held invalid as applied to public-concern speech under the
vagueness doctrine, which is meant to constrain the discretion of judges,
juries, and prosecutors, as well as to ensure that those who are subject to
the law have adequate notice about what it allows or forbids.348 The IIED
tort presents a similar problem.349 As Chief Justice Roberts observed,
“‘Outrageousness’ . . . is a highly malleable standard with ‘an inherent
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the
basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike
of a particular expression.’”350 This concern is well-founded, and it is
reinforced by one of the instructions that was given to the jury in Snyder.
That instruction failed to make sufficiently clear that Westboro could not
be held liable on the ground that its views were extreme and outrageous,
but only on the ground that its conduct in interfering with the funeral
was.351
The invasion-of-privacy claim in Snyder suffered from a similar
problem. To recover, the plaintiff was required to show that the defendants
had intentionally intruded on his private affairs or concerns in a way that

with their targets. Of course, the same is true of defamatory and privacy-invading speech. I believe
that we should take the same position on the funeral picketing at issue in Snyder.
347
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 580 (D. Md. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
348
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.2.2, at
970–72 (4th ed. 2011) (outlining the parameters of the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine).
349
For some good discussions, see Brownstein & Amar, supra note 316, at 385–87; Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 300, 300–03 (2010). But see Zipursky, supra note 16 (forcefully arguing that the tort
should not be considered unconstitutionally vague in the context of funeral picketing).
350
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (quoting Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
55 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted by Court).
351
The full text of the instruction is reproduced in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion. Snyder v. Phelps,
580 F.3d 206, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2009). A close reading of the instruction suggests that the district judge
attempted to draw this distinction but that he did not do so in a way that was clear enough to ensure that
the jury would understand. The instruction also was defective because it asked the jury itself to
determine whether the speech was entitled to constitutional protection—an issue that is generally
regarded as one for the court. This last point was one ground on which the appellate court relied in
reversing the judgment the plaintiff had won at trial. Id. at 221.
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“‘would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.’”
One can imagine
funeral protests that would clearly meet this standard—for example, if
Westboro’s members were to use amplification equipment to make
themselves heard by those inside the church where a funeral was taking
place. In a case like that, no serious problem of vagueness would arise. In
Snyder itself, however, it was hardly clear that the impact on the family’s
privacy should be considered “highly offensive” in view of the fact that the
protesters believed they were exercising rights protected by the First
Amendment. Once again, therefore, the tort was unduly vague as applied
to Westboro’s speech. On these grounds, while I disagree with the broader
reasoning in the Court’s opinion, I believe that it was correct to hold the
damages judgment inconsistent with the First Amendment.
352

VIII. BUFFER-ZONE LAWS
Although Westboro prevailed in Snyder, that victory may prove to be a
Pyrrhic one. Few, if any, other tort cases have been brought against
Westboro for its picketing of funerals. Instead, the most common legal
response has been the adoption of laws that restrict picketing within a
specified distance of a funeral.353 From a practical perspective, the most
important question after Snyder is whether these buffer-zone laws are
constitutional. The federal courts of appeals have been divided on this
issue. In Phelps-Roper v. Strickland,354 the Sixth Circuit ruled that such
laws may be justified by the need to protect the dignity of funerals and the
privacy and emotional well-being of mourners.355 The Fourth Circuit
expressed a similar view in Snyder itself.356 By contrast, in Phelps-Roper
v. Nixon,357 the Eighth Circuit asserted that these interests cannot justify a
restriction on the protesters’ freedom of expression.358
In Snyder, Chief Justice Roberts observes that, although public-issue
speech in a public forum is entitled to strong protection:
Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all
places and at all times. Westboro’s choice of where and
when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the
352
Snyder v. Phelps, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79020, at *30 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2006) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, at § 652B).
353
See infra text accompanying note 359.
354
539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008).
355
Id. at 362–66.
356
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).
357
545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2865 (2009).
358
Id. at 692. In the wake of Snyder, the Eighth Circuit voted to reconsider the issue en banc in
Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester. Ryan Koopmans, Eighth Circuit Grants Rehearing En Banc in
Funeral Protest Case, ON BRIEF: IOWA’S APPELLATE BLOG (Dec. 13, 2011, 4:36 PM),
http://iowaappeals.com/eighth-circuit-grants-rehearing-en-banc-in-funeral-protest-case.
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Government’s regulatory reachit is subject to reasonable
time, place, or manner restrictions that are consistent with the
standards announced in this Court’s precedents. Maryland
now has a law imposing restrictions on funeral picketing, as
do 43 other States and the Federal Government. To the
extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different
questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case.359
Although Chief Justice Roberts makes clear that the Court is not
passing on the constitutionality of these laws,360 this passage does suggest
that the government has some power to protect mourners through the
enactment of buffer-zone laws. If that turns out to be true, then although
Westboro won the battle over common-law tort liability in Snyder, it may
lose the larger war over the regulation of funeral picketing.
In this Part, I explore the use of time, place, and manner regulations in
the funeral context. I begin with the question of whether buffer-zone laws
are in fact “consistent with the standards announced in [the Supreme]
Court’s precedents.”361 Next, I discuss how broad a buffer zone may be.
Finally, I consider the sanctions that may be imposed for violations.
A. The Constitutionality of Buffer-Zone Laws
When Chief Justice Roberts referred to the standards set forth in earlier
decisions, he cited the Court’s 1984 opinion in Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence.362 That case indicates that time, place, and manner
regulations “are valid provided [1] that they are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and [3] that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”363
Buffer-zone laws regulate the times and places at which funeral
picketing may occur. A good example is the Ohio statute at issue in
Phelps-Roper.364 That law bans picketing within 300 feet of a place where
a funeral is being held, from one hour before to one hour after the
funeral.365 For the purpose of discussion, I shall focus on this statute,
359
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
360
Id.
361
Id.
362
Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
363
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
364
539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008).
365
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006). The statute provided that:

[N]o person shall picket or engage in other protest activities, nor shall any
association or corporation cause picketing or other protest activities to occur, within
three hundred feet of any residence, cemetery, funeral home, church, synagogue, or
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which is typical of the laws that have been passed in a number of
jurisdictions.366
Although the courts have been divided over the constitutionality of
such laws, they agree that the laws satisfy the first Clark requirement—that
of content neutrality. In determining whether a statute is content neutral,
the courts look to both its text and its purpose. The language of the Ohio
statute makes no reference to the content of the protesters’ speech. Instead,
the statute applies to all demonstrations without regard to whether they
support or oppose gay rights, or the Catholic Church, or the policies of the
United States military. There is no doubt, then, that the law is content
neutral on its face. As for purpose, the government can make a strong
argument that it sought to regulate funeral picketing not “because of
disagreement with the message” that it conveys,367 but because of the
importance of protecting the mourners attending funerals.
Of course, the great majority of funeral picketing laws have been
passed in response to Westboro’s activities.368 On this ground, the group
might argue that the laws violate the First Amendment doctrine that forbids
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. As the Supreme Court has made
clear, however, a statute should not be found to violate this doctrine
“simply because its enactment was motivated by the conduct of the
partisans on one side of a debate.”369 Instead, when a law aims to protect
an important interest such as privacy, and when the law applies
evenhandedly to all speech that seriously injures that interest, the law does
not amount to forbidden viewpoint discrimination.370
Westboro might also argue that buffer-zone laws are viewpointdiscriminatory because they restrict its own speech but not the speech of
those who desire to express more favorable messages toward the family.
In Snyder, for example, the route of the procession leaving the church was
lined by children from the Catholic school that Matthew had attended, as
well as by police and firefighters who saluted the procession as it went
other establishment during or within one hour before or one hour after the
conducting of an actual funeral or burial service at that place.
Id. The statute defined “other protest activities” to mean “any action that is disruptive or undertaken to
disrupt or disturb a funeral or burial service.” Id.
366
The local ordinance that is now before the Eighth Circuit en banc in Phelps-Roper v. City of
Manchester imposes similar restrictions. See Koopmans, supra note 358.
367
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 295)).
368
Interestingly, Ohio passed its first regulation of funeral picketing in 1957, long before
Westboro began to protest at funerals. See Strickland, 539 F.3d at 358. In 2006, the legislature made
several changes to the law, id., changes which no doubt were prompted by Westboro’s conduct.
369
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000).
370
See id. at 723–24 (upholding a law which sought to protect individuals from harassment when
entering health care facilities).
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371

by.
Also present outside the funeral were motorcyclists from the Patriot
Guard Riders, a veterans group that offers to attend to support the family
and to shield them from the Westboro protesters.372
Westboro might contend that the state cannot constitutionally
discriminate between these demonstrations and the ones that the church
engages in. This contention would be convincing if the other groups were
allowed to demonstrate in favor of certain ideological positions while
Westboro was forbidden to express its own opposing views. But that is not
an accurate description of what takes place in a situation like Snyder.
Instead, the school children, the public safety officers, and the Patriot
Guard Riders essentially act as participants in the funeral procession itself.
Thus, if a buffer-zone law were to permit their actions but not Westboro’s,
the law would not be discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, but would
simply be distinguishing between participants who were present to express
their support for the family and to pay their last respects to the deceased,
on one hand, and outsiders who sought to intrude into the observance to
express a particular ideological message to the mourners and the public, on
the other hand.
Finally, Westboro might argue that buffer-zone laws are content-based
because they seek to protect individuals against offensive speech. Of
course, it is a central tenet of contemporary First Amendment
jurisprudence that the law may not restrict speech on this ground.373 But
the Court has recognized an exception to this principle in situations where
“the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure.”374 “The right to avoid unwelcome speech has
special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings,
but can also be protected in confrontational settings” such as protests
outside a medical facility.375 In such situations, the Court has observed that
“[i]t may not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate ‘verbal
[or visual] assault,’ that justifies proscription.”376
This use of the captive audience doctrine fits the problem of funeral
picketing to a T. As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, mourners are
compelled to attend funerals not merely by the need for emotional support
but also by “deep tradition and social obligation.”377 Once there, they
cannot easily avoid exposure to disruptive picketing. Nor can they protect
371

Record, supra note 59, at 2082 (testimony of Albert Snyder).
Westboro Brief, supra note 310, at 6.
373
See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (“[T]he Constitution
does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently
offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.”).
374
Id. at 209.
375
Hill, 530 U.S. at 717 (citations omitted).
376
Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210 n.6.
377
Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2008).
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themselves by simply “avert[ing] their eyes” from the messages on the
signs, for, in a situation like this, the “mere presence” of intrusive
protesters “is sufficient to inflict the harm,”378 and Westboro does
everything it can to make its protests impossible to ignore.379 For these
reasons, I believe that funeral picketing is one of the rare situations in
which the government should be allowed to protect individuals against
unwelcome speech on the ground “that substantial privacy interests are
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”380
Thus, buffer-zone laws should be found to satisfy the first element of
the Court’s test for time, place, and manner regulations. For the reasons
discussed in Part V, the laws should also be found to advance “significant
government interest[s]”381 by protecting the privacy, emotional well-being,
and religious freedom of mourners, as well as the dignity and solemnity of
funerals. It also is difficult to deny that the laws “leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.”382 As Justice
Alito explained in his Snyder dissent, the First Amendment ensures that
Westboro’s members “have almost limitless opportunities to express their
views”:
They may write and distribute books, articles, and other
texts; they may create and disseminate video and audio
recordings; they may circulate petitions; they may speak to
individuals and groups in public forums and in any private
venue that wishes to accommodate them; they may picket
peacefully in countless locations; they may appear on
television and speak on the radio; they may post messages on
the Internet and send out e-mails.383
Moreover, a buffer-zone law would even allow them to picket as long as
they did so outside the specified zone or time period.
It follows that a buffer-zone law should be upheld under the Clark test
if it is “narrowly tailored.”384 One of the key issues that arise under this
heading is how large the zone can be.
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Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 306.
380
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). In Snyder, the majority found that this standard
was not met on the facts of the case. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). But this
conclusion rested in large part on the fact that Westboro had “stayed well away from the memorial
service.” Id. Of course, this conclusion does not conflict with the view that the state may require
protesters to “stay[] well away” in order to protect mourners from being forced to see or hear their
message. Id.
381
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
382
Id.
383
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
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B. The Size of the Buffer Zone
In Snyder, the Court offered two examples of situations in which it had
approved restrictions on “the location of targeted picketing.”385 In Frisby
v. Schultz,386 the Court “upheld a ban on such picketing ‘before or about’ a
particular residence.”387 In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,388 the
Court upheld a provision of an injunction that banned picketing within
thirty-six feet of the property line of a clinic that performed abortions, but
struck down another provision that banned picketing within 300 feet of the
residence of an employee or owner of the clinic.389 Westboro would argue
that a funeral picketing law should not be upheld if it establishes a buffer
zone substantially larger than those upheld in Frisby and Madsen.
This argument is unpersuasive, however. As the Court indicated in
Madsen, courts “must, of course, take account of the place to which the
regulations apply in determining whether these restrictions burden more
speech than necessary.”390 In other words, what constitutes an appropriate
buffer zone depends on the particular context.391
The critical issue here is whether Westboro has a right to communicate
with the mourners at all. As I argued in Part VI, the answer is no because
this would inflict serious and unwarranted injury on them. If this view is
correct, then the First Amendment should allow the government to
establish a buffer zone that is large enough to keep the protesters out of the
sight and hearing of the mourners.
This conclusion does not conflict with the Court’s opinion in Snyder.
Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the demonstration in that case took
place “some 1,000 feet from the church, out of sight of those at the
church.”392 In this situation, he treated the speech as addressed to the
public at large, rather than to those attending the funeral.393 Snyder holds
that Westboro has a constitutional right to communicate with the public
and to do so in a way that uses the funeral “to increase publicity for its
views,” even if this causes emotional injury to the family.394 But the
decision does not hold that Westboro has a First Amendment right to
communicate directly with the mourners themselves. Unless the Court is
prepared to hold that there is such a right, it would seem perfectly
reasonable for states to establish buffer zones that keep the protesters “well
385

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1212.
487 U.S. 474 (1988).
387
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477).
388
512 U.S. 753 (1994).
389
Id. at 768–71, 774–75.
390
Id. at 772.
391
See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 368 (6th Cir. 2008).
392
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218.
393
See supra text accompanying note 69.
394
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217–18.
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away” from the funeral, while permitting them to stand close enough to
use it as a backdrop for their expression. On this view, state laws that
establish buffer zones of several hundred feet should not be held to violate
the First Amendment.
The same reasoning supports the constitutionality of the central
provisions of section 601 of the Honoring America’s Veterans Act
(“HAVA”), which was passed by Congress in the summer of 2012.396
Section 601(a) sets forth the constitutional authority for the
ActCongress’s powers in relation to the militaryas well as the Act’s
purpose: to promote the recruitment and retention of members of the
Armed Forces “by protecting the dignity of [their] service” as well as “the
privacy of their immediate family members and other attendees during
funeral services for such members.”397 Section 601(b) adopts time, place,
and manner regulations for funerals at cemeteries that are not controlled by
the federal government.398 These regulations are codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1388.399 Finally, section 601(c) imposes similar regulations (which are
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2413) with respect to Arlington National Cemetery
and other sites that are under federal control.400
For purposes of simplicity, I shall focus on 18 U.S.C. § 1388. The
statute sets forth three prohibitions. First, subsection (a)(1) makes it
unlawful, within 300 feet of a military funeral, to willfully make “any
noise or diversion . . . that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good
order of such funeral, . . . with the intent of disturbing the peace or good
order of such funeral.”401 As I have explained, a provision like this should
be upheld as a reasonable effort to protect the dignity of funerals and the
privacy of mourners.402 Second, subsection (a)(2) makes it unlawful,
within 500 feet of a funeral, to willfully impede access to or egress from
the location where it is being held403conduct that clearly is not protected
395

395

Id. at 1220.
Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012, P.L 112154, § 601, 126 Stat. 1165, slip law at 1, 31–35 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1388 and 38 U.S.C. § 2413).
An explanation and constitutional defense of the Act may be found in S. REP. NO. 112–88, at 39–45
(2011).
397
§ 601(a), slip law at 31.
398
§ 601(b), slip law at 32–33.
399
Id.
400
§ 601(c), slip law at 34–35.
401
18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1) (2012). Congress’s first effort to regulate funeral protests at nonfederal
cemeteries was the Respect for the Funerals of Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. 109-464, § 1, 120 Stat. 3480,
3480-81 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1388 (prior to 2012 amendment)). Under that law, the
distance was 150 feet. 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(2) (prior to 2012 amendment).
402
See supra text accompanying notes 390–95.
403
18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(2). Under the 2006 law, the distance was 300 feet. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1388(a)(2) (prior to 2012 amendment).
396
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404

by the First Amendment. Finally, subsection (a)(3) makes it unlawful to
stand near the home of a family member of the deceased and to willfully
create any noise or diversion that intentionally disturbs the peace of that
person.405 This provision protects residential privacy in the same way that
the Court approved in Frisby v. Schultz,406 and it does so in a situation
where the privacy interest is far more compelling.
Under the Act, these restrictions apply from two hours before to two
hours after a funeral.407 Westboro might argue that this time period is too
long and that it does not strike a reasonable balance between the competing
interests of the protesters and the mourners. It is not clear, however, that
this provision falls outside the bounds of reasonable legislative judgment.
Moreover, it is important to remember that subsection (a)(1) applies only
to acts that intentionally disturb the peace or good order of the funeral. 408
There is no reason that such acts should receive constitutional protection
simply because they take place more than, say, an hour before or after the
funeral. And this point is even clearer with respect to section (a)(2)’s
prohibition on intentionally interfering with access or egress and section
(a)(3)’s ban on intentionally disturbing the peace of mourners.
Accordingly, these provisions should be upheld under the Court’s time,
place, and manner doctrine.409

404
See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (upholding a statute that was designed to
protect “the right of ‘passage without obstruction’” when entering or leaving an abortion clinic); id. at
747 (Scalia., J., dissenting) (recognizing that the state may proscribe conduct that “impede[s] . . . or
block[s] access to a health care facility”); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 380–82
(1997) (upholding an injunction establishing a buffer zone as a reasonable way to prevent interference
with access to or egress from an abortion clinic).
405
18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(3).
406
487 U.S. 474 (1988); see also S. REP. NO. 112–88, at 41 (2011) (relying on Frisby in support
of this provision).
407
18 U.S.C. § 1388(a).
408
18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1)(B)(2).
409
Some of the Act’s other provisions are more problematic. For example, § 1388(e) provides:

It shall be a rebuttable presumption that the violation was committed willfully for
purposes of determining relief under this section if the violator, or a person acting in
concert with the violator, did not have reasonable grounds to believe, either from the
attention or publicity sought by the violator or other circumstance, that the conduct
of such violator or person would not disturb or tend to disturb the peace or good
order of such funeral, impede or tend to impede the access to or egress from such
funeral, or disturb or tend to disturb the peace of any surviving member of the
deceased person's immediate family who may be found on or near the residence,
home, or domicile of the deceased person's immediate family on the date of the
service or ceremony.
18 U.S.C. § 1388(e). 38 U.S.C. § 2413(e) contains similar language. These somewhat opaque
provisions raise complex issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation which I shall not explore
here. See infra note 414 (discussing the Act’s provisions for “statutory damages”).
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C. Sanctions for Violation
In Snyder, the Court overturned a judgment that required Westboro to
pay tort damages for IIED and invasion of privacy. It may seem, then, that
while Snyder leaves the door open for the adoption of buffer-zone laws, it
holds that funeral protesters cannot be subjected to damages liability. For
two reasons, however, the decision should not be read that broadly. First,
as Chief Justice Roberts made clear, the opinion “is limited by the
particular facts” of the case.410 That does not mean the opinion contains no
broader holdings. As I read it, for example, it does indicate that the
standards for IIED are inherently so subjective that they cannot
constitutionally be applied to any instance of otherwise protected speech
on matters of public concern, at least when the speech takes place within a
public forum.411 However, the Court makes no broad pronouncements
about the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.412 To return to an earlier
hypothetical, if Westboro were to use amplification equipment to be heard
within the church itself, it seems unlikely that the Court would hold that
the First Amendment precluded the award of damages for invasion of
privacy.
Second, and more importantly, Snyder’s rejection of IIED liability was
based largely on the ground that the liability was a reaction to the content
of Westboro’s speech, as well as on the ground that the tort was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to public-issue speech.413 But these
two objections would not necessarily apply to other kinds of laws that
imposed civil liability. For example, a legislature might enact a law
establishing a specific buffer zone around funerals and providing that
violators should be subject not only to criminal penalties but also to civil
liability for any injuries caused to other individuals by the violation. Such
a law would not be content-based, nor would it be vague. In this way, the
legislature could grant families a remedy for the harms caused by intrusive
funeral protests without raising the concerns that led the Court to overturn
the damages award in Snyder.414
410

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
See id. at 1219.
412
See id. at 1219–20 (holding only that “the captive audience doctrine” should not be
“expand[ed]” to apply “to the circumstances presented here”).
413
See id. at 1219 (“In a case such as this, a jury is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the
content of [the] speech, posing a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression
of . . . vehement caustic, and sometimes unpleasan[t] expression.” (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
414
Congress has now provided such a remedy in cases governed by federal law. The HAVA
provides that “[a]ny person, including a surviving member of the deceased person’s immediate family,
who suffers injury as a result of conduct that violates” the Act may sue the violator for damages.
Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-154,
§ 601(b), (c), 126 Stat. 1165, slip law at 1, 31, 32–33, 34 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1388(c)(3) and 38
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IX. CONCLUSION
Snyder v. Phelps appears to strike an important blow for the First
Amendment freedom of speech by making clear that it encompasses even
the most unpopular and offensive kinds of expression. As I have tried to
show, however, the decision is deeply problematic for several reasons. To
begin with, the Court fundamentally misunderstands the nature of
Westboro’s expression. The majority maintains that “Westboro’s choice to
conduct its picketing [near Matthew Snyder’s funeral] did not alter the
nature of its speech,” which was primarily intended to communicate with
the public on matters of public concern.415 But Westboro’s members did
not regard themselves as merely holding a demonstration that was
“planned to coincide” with the funeral.416 Instead, they announced that
they would “picket [the] funeral” in order to proclaim that Matthew was
“[n]ow in Hell” and to convey a message of God’s hatred not only to the
public in general but also to his family, friends, and religious
community.417 And as the record shows, Matthew’s father received this
message loud and clear.
In this way, the Court fails to recognize the human meaning of
Westboro’s picketing—the meaning that it had for those who engaged in it
as well as for those who were targeted by it. The Court also fails to
appreciate the human impact of the speech. Although the majority
acknowledges that the picketing caused great distress, it attributes that
distress to offense at Westboro’s ideology, rather than to the profound
personal attack that the group leveled against Matthew Snyder and his
family.
The deepest problem with Snyder is that it reinforces a theme that has
become increasingly prevalent in our jurisprudence—the notion that the
First Amendment requires us to protect public speech regardless of how
insulting, abusive, or degrading it may be. According to the Court, we
must take this position in order to avoid any “potential interference with a
U.S.C. § 2413(c)(3)). The injured party may opt to recover either (1) actual damages or (2) “statutory
damages” in an amount between $25,000 and $50,000 for each violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1388(d); 38
U.S.C. § 2413(d). Although actual damages should be deemed constitutional for the reasons I have
given, statutory damages are more problematic. For example, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974), the Court held that presumed damages may not be awarded in defamation actions for
statements on matters of public concern unless the statements meet the New York Times standard of
knowing or reckless falsity. See id. at 349–50. A court that reviewed the HAVA’s constitutionality
would have to determine whether a similar doctrine should apply to its provisions on statutory
damages, and if so, whether the doctrine was satisfied by the mens rea requirements set forth in
§§ 1388(a) and 2413(a), see supra text accompanying notes 401–05, as qualified by the rebuttable
presumption discussed in supra note 409.
415
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217, 1220.
416
Id. at 1220.
417
Westboro, News Release, supra note 95.
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meaningful dialogue of ideas.”
As the case of funeral picketing makes
clear, however, this view is ultimately self-defeating, for a meaningful
dialogue is possible only when the participants show one another at least a
minimal level of respect. In this way, the Court’s approach not only
negates the law’s protections for individual personality, but also
undermines the practical and normative conditions for public discourse
itself.
This Article has offered an alternative theory of the First Amendment.
That theory holds that the same values that support freedom of speech also
give rise to other fundamental rights, including privacy, dignity, emotional
well-being, and other facets of what Justice Brandeis called the right to “an
inviolate personality.”419 Westboro’s funeral picketing invades those rights
in the most blatant manner by intentionally interfering with the mourners’
ability to bury a loved one in peace. Although Snyder largely precludes the
use of tort law to protect these rights, it does suggest that buffer-zone laws
may be enacted for this purpose. Imposing reasonable restrictions on
funeral picketing would not undermine our constitutional commitment to
freedom of expression, but instead would reaffirm the values of human
freedom and dignity on which it is based.
418

418
419

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 217, at 205.
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